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I.  INTRODUCTION
Although Article I of the Constitution vests legislative power in the Congress, the
lawmaking process in this country has evolved to involve all three branches.  Congress
enacts regulatory programs, but delegates to the executive branch the task of formulating
and legislating the details of implementation through regulations.  Once the executive
branch agencies have acted, Article III courts routinely step in to review the consistency
of these regulations with congressional mandates.  In many cases, especially in the case
of controversial regulations, the lawmaking process is not complete until judicial review.
Entities burdened by such regulations—so-called “regulatory objects”—enjoy presumed
standing to challenge the scope of agency regulations.  Groups of individuals benefited
by such regulations enjoy no such presumption of “standing,” rather, their right to
challenge depends on their ability to establish a specific injury-in-fact and the redress-
ability of that injury through judicial decree.
These injury-in-fact and redressability requirements are most difficult to establish
in the context that underlies the modern regulatory schema (i.e., regulation of societal
risks such as environmental and consumer risks).  These regulations seek to protect the
public against harms that may have a low probability of occurrence for any given
individual but pose significant risks for society at large, or even for substantial groups
of individual citizens.  Courts have wrestled with the concepts of injury and redress-
ability in the context of probabilistic harms and have split on the question of whether
individuals, or combinations of individuals, can establish the requisites of justiciability
based on low-probability events.1  Most recently, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the use of probabilistic analysis to establish the likelihood of future injury, at
least in the context of a challenge to procedural regulations.2
Many, if not most, rulemaking challenges by regulatory beneficiaries are brought
by public interest organizations.  These organizations usually have memberships
ranging from thousands to millions of individuals.  These organizational plaintiffs fall
into the category of “ideological” plaintiffs—parties who invoke the judicial process
to establish and enforce public rights for the benefit of many people, who are not
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3. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1968).  Cf. Kristen M. Shults, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services: A Resounding Victory for Environmentalists, Its Implications on Future
Justiciability Decisions, and Resolution of Issues on Remand, 89 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1014 n.74 (2001).  Shults
provided:
Ideological plaintiffs are those that care about the outcome of a case for ideological reasons
but do not have a personal stake in the particular dispute at hand.  For instance, an
environmentalist has a general ideological interest in preventing the discharge of pollutants
into rivers, but will not have a concrete and particularized injury in a case such as Laidlaw,
unless she lives along, or visits, the polluted river.
Id.
4. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
5. NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
primarily motivated by individual gain.3  Ideological plaintiffs—litigating everything
from Religion Clause issues to consumers’ rights to environmental and health concerns
—have had mixed success in establishing justiciability in Article III courts.  These
organizations have been required by Supreme Court doctrine to rely on the individual
interests of their members to establish standing.
The traditional test for representative standing requires an organizational party to
demonstrate that it has at least one member who would have standing in her own right.4
Under this approach, no single member of an organization may be able to show a
significant injury to herself, even though, probabilistically, serious harm to at least one
member of a large organization may be nearly certain.  This aggregation of the risk of
harm led a D.C. Circuit panel to reverse itself and recognize organizational standing
on the part of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).  The panel based its
decision on the likelihood that at least two to four of NRDC’s members would contract
skin cancer from exposure to ultraviolet radiation caused by continued use of ozone-
depleting chemicals, despite the fact that the individual risk for any single member of
NRDC was vanishingly small.5  In such a case the whole of the injury-in-fact may be
greater than the sum of the individual parts, and an organization representing thousands
or millions of individuals with strong concerns about a regulatory program may well
possess the requisite interest in enforcing statutory norms.  Literal application of the
representational standing requirements, requiring a specific individual member with
standing to sue in her own right, would be problematic for such organizations.
Although barely recognized by the courts, the Constitution contains a provision
specifically meant to ensure the right of individuals to associate and seek remedies
from all branches of the government, including the judicial branch.  The First
Amendment guarantees the “right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances.”6  Like the First Amendment guarantees
of speech and freedom of the press, this constitutional provision is designed to ensure
public representation and participation in the lawmaking process.  Likewise,
constitutional jurisprudence has evolved to ensure maximum input is provided to the
political processes that lead to legislation.  This is particularly true in the area of First
Amendment jurisprudence, where the Supreme Court has recognized the functional
importance of political speech to a representative democracy.
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7. Jaffe, supra note 3, at 1033.
8. Id. (citing Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913)).
9. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
10. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
This Article argues for an expanded notion of organizational standing and injury-
in-fact in judicial review of agency lawmaking action, based on the functional values
implicit in the First Amendment right to assembly and petition for redress of
grievances.  Judge-made standing doctrine should recognize the difference between
litigation to enforce individual rights—where inquiries into individual injury-in-fact
and the relationship between an organization and its individually-injured members may
be appropriate—and regulatory review litigation that is the ultimate step in the
lawmaking process, where full airing of competing views is essential to the judicial
review function, and the dangers to the constitutional assignment of functions is at a
minimum.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews and defines the nature of “ideological
plaintiffs.”  Part II explores the lopsided role that industry interest groups play in all
three branches of American representative government as compared to public interest
and consumer groups.  Part III examines the importance of judicial review of
administrative rulemaking and the problematic threshold that standing doctrine raises
for regulatory beneficiaries seeking to challenge administrative under-regulation.  In
Part IV, this Article reviews the doctrinal development of standing doctrine, the
interests served by standing rules, and the uneven success ideological plaintiffs have
enjoyed in establishing standing.  Part V of this Article reviews First Amendment
Petition Clause jurisprudence and its application to judicial petitioning activities,
concluding that the Petition Clause applies to petitions seeking judicial redress and that
its values are strongest when organized groups exercising their associational rights seek
judicial redress.  Part VI of this Article then develops and applies a First Amendment
balancing approach to the values and interests served by judicial petitioning activity
and standing doctrine, concluding that a standing doctrine more closely tailored to the
representative capacity and sham-avoiding interests of standing doctrine would be
more consistent with the Petition Clause than current standing doctrine.
II.  WHAT IS AN IDEOLOGICAL PLAINTIFF?
Professor Louis Jaffe coined the term “ideological plaintiff” in his 1968 article,
The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff.7  Professor Jaffe used the term to distinguish between plaintiffs asserting
traditional interests such as a “right, a privilege, an immunity, or a power,” borrowing
from a 1913 article by Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,8 and those asserting
interests as citizens.  Jaffe specifically had in mind the taxpayer-plaintiff who was
challenging governmental support of religious schools in Flast v. Cohen,9 and the
competing broadcast license-holder in FCC v. Sanders Broadcasting.10  In Sanders,
the Supreme Court recognized the standing of a holder of an existing broadcast license
to seek judicial review of the grant of a new license to its would-be competitor,
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11. Associated Indus., Inc. of N.Y. State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), (citing FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940)), vacating as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
12. Sanders, 309 U.S. at 476-77.  
13. Jaffe, supra note 3, at 1033-34.
14. See, e.g., Flast, 392 U.S. 83.
15. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
16. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984).
17. Cf. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 898-99 (1990) (rejecting standing of plaintiff for
failing to prove that a member of the plaintiff’s organization was “adversely affected or aggrieved” by the
agency’s action that would potentially make some public land available for private use).
18. Compare Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 766 (1984) (rejecting claim of social stigma in challenge
to IRS policies facilitating segregated private schools that draw students from integrated public schools)
with Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (accepting plaintiffs’ social interest in
residing in an integrated community as basis for standing); Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 102-03 (1979) (accord with Trafficante); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. at 739-40 (accepting claim
of stigma injury from pension rules discriminating between male and female retirees).
19. 354 F.2d 608, 611 (2d Cir. 1965) (where a coalition of  nearby property owners, recreational users,
and commercial users of the Hudson River challenged approvals for a pumped storage electrical generation
facility that would interfere with scenic views as well as fisheries resources).
extending standing for the first time to business competitors and recognizing the status
of litigants as “private attorneys general”11 seeking to represent the public interest.12
Professor Jaffe thus set up a dichotomy between plaintiffs asserting traditional
Hohfeldian legal interests and “ideological” plaintiffs asserting the public interest.  Of
course, Professor Jaffe recognized the inherent circularity of his definition: once the
plaintiff has been recognized as a litigant, she may be said to have a legal right to the
relief sought, in Hohfeldian terms.13
In this Article, I will use “ideological plaintiff” in terms similar to those proposed
by Professor Jaffe, but a little narrower.  Recognizing the circularity of an attempt to
define ideological plaintiffs in terms of Hohfeldian “rights,” I propose to refer more
to the root sense of the word: ideological plaintiffs are those plaintiffs motivated to
seek judicial intervention not for personal gain, but to advance an idea such as a vision
of government’s non-support of religion,14 the preservation of endangered species
across the globe,15 or equal treatment without regard to race or other classifications.16
Of course, most ideological plaintiffs have mixed motives, and most might be
expected to obtain some personal benefit from success.  The litigant who sues to
prevent clearcutting of a forest might be motivated in part by the idea of wilderness,
but may also be motivated by an interest in the personal freedom to continue hiking in
the forest.17  The citizens who sue to block government support for religious schools
may be strongly interested in the idea of government non-entanglement with religion,
but may also be motivated, at some level, out of concern for personal social status as
outsiders to the favored religious group.  Although it may be possible to articulate
these chains of personal interest that motivate these plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has
not uniformly accepted them as requisite injury-in-fact to establish standing.18
When I use the term “ideological plaintiff,” I am referring to those plaintiffs whose
putative personal advantage is far outweighed, as a practical matter, by the costs of
litigation, so that their pursuit of the litigation can only be seen as vigorous pursuit of
the underlying societal ideal rather than personal gain.  Thus, although Professor Jaffe
viewed the individual environmental litigants in a case such as Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission,19 as “ideological” “non-
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20. Jaffe, supra note 3, at 1034.
21. Communities Against Runaway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(granting standing where neighborhoods would suffer from increased noise resulting from the proposed
expansion of a major airport); Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 937 (9th Cir. 1988)
(granting standing to organization where community members would be adversely impacted by dredging
and other construction activities).  
22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 63 (James Madison) (Tudor Publ’g Co., 1937).
23. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 46-47 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve
trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1987) (1835).
Hohfeldian” plaintiffs,20 I would not—they can be said to be motivated by strong
personal interests in the aesthetics and environment of their immediate environs,
including the views from their houses and their ability to enjoy the fisheries’ resources
of the river.  While these interests may not be “rights” in the Hohfeldian sense, they do
constitute personal advantages that could well justify the level of litigation effort
mounted by committed neighbors.21
On the other hand, the national organizations that support these litigation efforts
are almost universally ideologically motivated.  That is to say, these groups are
organized around an idea—consumer product safety, wilderness preservation, separa-
tion of church and State, etc.—and draw support from a large membership for their
litigation efforts to advance the organizing principle.  Although these groups must,
because of the current state of standing doctrine, identify individual members with
particular interests to litigate, the financial contributions of the particular individuals
benefited would rarely justify the level of litigation effort mounted by the organization.
Rather, these groups prosper, or fail, on the basis of their ability to attract broad-based
support from those who share their ideals.
The organizational participation in these cases, then, is usually almost purely
ideological.  Supreme Court standing doctrine is openly hostile to the assertion of
purely ideological causes by these organizations.  However, given the associational and
structural role these organizations play in balancing the opposite pressures of industry
lobbying groups, I believe that, in some contexts, the Court should recognize their pure
ideological standing, and, as this Article will seek to persuade, the Petition Clause
provides some textual and structural support for this notion.
III.  THE LOPSIDED ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN SELF-GOVERNANCE
From the founding, the American polity has grappled with the role of interest
groups in our republican form of self-governance.  It was James Madison’s Federalist
Number 10 that famously warned of majority factions,22 and de Tocqueville noted the
Americans’ predilection for organization-joining,23 but it was not until the vast
expansion of federal government after the New Deal that America witnessed a
corresponding expansion of interest group participation in government.  This expan-
sion itself led to competing academic views concerning the appropriate role of such
groups in self governance.
At the same time, the nature of governance and the lawmaking process has
changed dramatically from the vision of representative democracy held by the
founders, with delegates to a national legislature making laws in response to the needs
and wishes of the involved citizens they represent.  The substantive rules prevailing in
384 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2
24. This section is obviously a very far cry from a history of organized interest groups in the American
political system.  This brief summary draws from the summaries presented in KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN
& JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986), and Reuel E. Schiller,
Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1389 (2000).
25. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 22, at 63.
26. Id. at 64-65.
the administrative state are no longer the product solely of a legislature acting
according to majoritarian wishes.  Rather, the end product is the result of enabling
statutes enacted by the legislature, substantive law-making by the administrative
agency charged with applying the statutes, and a last step of judicial review to deter-
mine the permissibility of the end product within the bounds of statutory and
constitutional norms.  Interest groups play a role in each of these steps, and the interest
group system in this country has evolved to vastly over-represent the interests of small
groups of the well-resourced—namely business interests.  The appropriate role of
public interest groups in this last step to counterbalance the strong role played by
business interests in the first two steps is the subject of this article.
A.  Some Historical Views24
1.  James Madison and Factions
James Madison, advocating for the proposed Constitution in The Federalist
Papers, early on called out the risks of “factions”—that is, groups of citizens who
share common interests and who band together to impose those interests upon the
community through the mechanisms of representative government.  Madison defined
a faction as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community.”25  Madison’s list of interests that motivate the formation
of factions was prescient:
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many
other points, as well of speculation as of practice; . . . have, in turn, divided mankind
into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more
disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. . . .
But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and
unequal distribution of property.  Those who hold and those who are without property
have ever formed distinct interests in society.  Those who are creditors, and those who
are debtors, fall under a like discrimination.  A landed interest, a manufacturing
interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up
of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by
different sentiments and views.  The regulation of these various and interfering
interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of
party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.26
Madison was unconcerned that factions representing the interests of political
minorities would gain inappropriate influence.  According to Madison, the political
will of the majority would defeat minority factions: “If a faction consists of less than
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27. Id. at 66.
28. Id. at 68-69.
29. The following, extremely reductive summary of the interest group pluralists school of thought is
drawn from the excellent treatments of this movement in MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION, 117-25 (2d prtg. 1971); SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 24, at ix-x; and Schiller, supra note
24, at 1400-02.
30. See generally OLSON, supra note 29; SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 24; Schiller, supra note
24.
a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority
to defeat its sinister views by regular vote.”27
Rather, Madison worried that popular government might allow a faction consisting
of a majority political interest to impose its will on the political minority.  Madison
concludes (or rather argues) that the proposed Republic will deftly avoid the problems
of majority factions by being sufficiently large geographically to prevent such factions
from coalescing, as well as by having the filter of  more objective and community-
minded representatives mediating between a popular faction and the aggregate well
being.28
Of course, there is some tension between Madison’s dismissal of the hazards of
“minority” factions, easily overrun by a vote reflecting the popular will, and the
remedy for majority factions, to which the same representative body is expected to be
unresponsive.  Madison’s prediction of the inevitable formation of factions around
economic and government issues was prescient, even if his sanguinity about the
checking function of democratic responsibility, common sense, and good instincts of
the representative body may be questioned by some.
2.  Twentieth Century Interest Group Pluralists29
The economic expansion following the Second World War saw an expansion of
interest group influence on government institutions.  Some scholars and historians
commented on this development positively, believing that representative self-
government and the best policy outcomes flowed from the competition between group
interests of shifting alliances, applying pressure to government institutions with an
intensity that varied with the intensity and importance of the views held.30  Under this
view, interest groups constituted the true means of citizen representation in govern-
ment, according to their interests rather than arbitrary geographic districts.  Also, in
this view, interest group politics protected against majority tyranny by giving
disproportional representation to the interests of a strongly concerned minority.
These theorists not only accepted that interest groups would influence government
policy, they embraced and applauded the notion.  According to one view, the
legislative process was simply one of measuring the net sum of interest group pressure:
The legislature referees the group struggle, ratifies the victories of the successful
coalitions, and records the terms of the surrenders, compromises, and conquests in the
form of statutes.  Every statute tends to represent compromise because the process of
accommodating conflicts of group interest is one of deliberation and consent.  The
legislative vote on any issue tends to represent the composition of strength, i.e., the
balance of power, among the contending groups at the time of voting.  What may be
called public policy is the equilibrium reached in this struggle at any given moment,
386 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2
31. EARL LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS: A STUDY IN BASING-POINT LEGISLATION, 35-36
(1952).
32. Id. at 38.
33. See OLSON, supra note 29, at 122-23 (discussing Professor David Truman’s theory regarding the
proliferation of associations). 
34. See generally Schiller, supra note 24, at 1410-16.
35. OLSON supra note 29, at 2.
36. Id. at 16.
37. Id. at 33-34.
and it represents a balance which the contending factions of groups constantly strive
to weight in their favor.31
Agency capture by the interest groups was not to be feared either; rather, agencies were
the “army of occupation left in the field to police the rule won by the victorious
coalition.”32
Implicit in this laudatory view of interest group politics was the idea that all
interests received appropriate representation in the process.  Proponents of interest
group pluralism theorized that this must be so, as any group of people with shared
interests who saw their interests being ignored would simply form their own interest
group to press their interests.33  If they did not, the ignored interests were presumably
not very intensely held and there was no harm in ignoring these weakly felt interests.
3.  1960s Critics of Interest Group Pluralism
As the Civil Rights movement began in the 1960s, academic political scientists
and economists became critical of the assumptions underlying proponents of interest
group pluralism.34  These critics argued that interest group influence on public
institutions turned public authority over to private interests.  They did not accept that
interest groups would form spontaneously to represent any shared interest that was
being ignored by policy-makers.  To the contrary, as economist Mancur Olson
theorized, the more widely shared an interest was the less likely a rational economic
actor would make the personal contributions necessary to form and support an
organization to advance that interest.35  According to Olson, when an interest is widely
shared most people would benefit from the efforts of an organized interest group
working on their behalf whether they joined and supported the organization or not.
Because such organizations could not withhold the public benefits of success from
non-supporters, no individual has an economic incentive sufficient to support the
organization.36  Under Olson’s analysis, the situation is reversed when interests are
held by just a few actors; in that case a small number of individuals would find it
worthwhile to band together to push for their interests even if some other members of
the small group of interested parties did not join.  The key determinant was the
proportion of the benefit to be shared by the one actor most to benefit, and the
relationship between the costs of organizing and the value of this benefit.37
Professor Olson’s analysis would lead one to expect more organized
representation of business interests in concentrated industries, and less organized
representation of majoritarian interests.  This concern was shared by James Q. Wilson
and Peter B. Clark, who exposed the difficulties confronting anyone wishing to start
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38. See Peter B. Clark & James Q. Wilson, Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations, 6 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 129, 146-49 (1961); see also JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 30-51, 195-211 (1973).
39. E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 35 (1960).
40. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 355 (1956).
41. See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 24, at xi (summarizing the arguments of group pluralist
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42. See Schiller, supra note 24, at 1390-92.
43. Id. at 1391.
44. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 7 (1991); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications Of Public Choice Theory For Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 288 (1988).  Although public choice theorists such as Farber and
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group rent seeking, others such as Eskridge take this economic model of multi-polar group decisionmaking
even further to conclude that rational legislative decisionmaking is impossible.  However, for the purposes
of this article, the public choice theorists’ insight that concentrated interests have disproportionate impact
on national legislation is sufficient.
45. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 44, at 7; Eskridge supra note 44, at 285-89.
and maintain a political organization representing interests held by large numbers of
people.38  Along the same lines, another critic of the utopia posited by interest group
theorists, E.E. Schattschneider, pointed out that “the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that
the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.”39
However, these critics agreed with the interest group pluralists on one point:
interest groups substantially influenced government institutions.  As one critic of group
pluralists put it, “manipulation and undebated decisions of power replaced democratic
authority.”40  Unlike the interest group pluralists, who saw such influence on govern-
ment institutions as an appropriate accommodation of self-government to the intensity
of the views represented by the interest groups, these critics pointed out that the effect
was to turn government over to private interests.  In the meantime, widely shared
interests of the economically disadvantaged as well as consumers and environmenta-
lists were left without representation in government.41
Professor Reul Schiller has theorized that judicial and legislative responses to
these criticisms of the imbalanced influence of organized interests in politics resulted
in: (1) the expansion of standing doctrine during the 1960s to recognize “private
attorneys general” representing the public interest, (2) expanded vigor in judicial
review of administrative action, and (3) the citizen suit innovation of the Clean Air Act
of 1970.42  In his view, the judiciary came to be seen as the only institution beyond the
reach of organized interest influence, and the judiciary itself responded to the
imbalance that was apparent in the two more political branches of government.43
4.  The Current View: Public Choice, Money, and Politics
Drawing on Mancur Olson’s economics-based criticism of interest group
pluralism, public choice theorists have posited that legislatures act based on the self-
interested rational choices of individual legislators, who will always act in ways that
will maximize their chance of re-election, even at the expense of the collective good.44
These theorists conclude that legislation with a concentrated benefit and diffused costs
is easiest to enact, whereas legislation with concentrated costs and diffused benefits
(like environmental and health regulations) is most difficult to enact.45
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Political scientists Kay Schlozman and John Tierney put the anti-pluralists’
theories to the test in their 1986 survey of Washington, D.C., interest group activities.
Based on a systematic survey of all interest groups represented, their study concluded
that business interests were far better represented than groups that represented the
broad public interest:
Whether one considers all the organizations having a Washington presence or just
those having their own Washington offices, it is clear that Schattschneider’s
observations two decades ago about the shape of the Washington pressure community
are apt today.  Taken as a whole, the pressure community is heavily weighted in favor
of business organizations: 70 percent of all organizations having a Washington
presence and 52 percent of those having their own offices represent business.  The
overrepresentation of business interests takes place at the expense of two other kinds
of organizations: groups representing broad public interests and groups representing
the less advantaged.46
Schlozman and Tierney find that this tilt in favor of business interests persists despite
the explosion in the number of public interest organizations advocating for civil rights
and social welfare issues since the 1960s; although the number of such organizations
increased during this time period, there was a corresponding increase in the number of
organizations representing business interests, leaving the overall representation skewed
in favor of business.47
Schlozman and Tierney concluded that the representational tilt in favor of business
interests was magnified by the advantage business representatives had in terms of
resources, particularly money.  Schlozman and Tierney surveyed organizations on the
factors constraining their effectiveness, and, not surprisingly, groups representing
broad public interests were more likely to be constrained by money than business
interests: “At least in terms of perceived relative deprivation, the very business
interests that were found . . . to be advantaged in terms of the numbers of organizations
active in Washington are also advantaged in terms of access to financial resources.”48
Although the organizations in the study did not necessarily rank financial resources
highest on their list of attributes needed for success, Schlozman and Tierney noted that
money is the one resource universally convertible into the others: “What makes money
important in politics is its convertibility—the fact that it can easily be transformed into
other valued political resources.”49  
While Schlozman and Tierney were conducting their study, the Supreme Court
issued two decisions that greatly expanded the role and influence of business
organizations in politics.  In Buckley v. Valeo,50 the Court struck down portions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 197151 that limited the total amount of expenditures
permissible in a federal election campaign, holding that the expenditure by political
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campaigns was a form of political speech protected by the First Amendment.52  In First
National Bank v. Bellotti,53 the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that
prohibited business corporations from making expenditures to support or oppose ballot
initiatives unrelated to their business interests.
The effect of these two decisions vastly increased the citizenship rights and
influence of monied interests and business organizations in the political sphere.
Unlimited campaign expenditures gave rise to unlimited campaign fundraising, which
correspondingly increased the number and influence of Political Action Committees
(PACs).  As noted by Schlozman and Tierney, campaign contributions directed by
corporate PACs constitute a prime means for Washington interest groups to wield
influence on lawmakers.54  Judge J. Skelly Wright, who wrote the D.C. Circuit opinion
that was reversed in Buckley v. Valeo, lamented the impact of unleashing unlimited
corporate money on voter equality.  In a 1982 article, Judge Skelly wrote:
The stark reality of PACs is that they bring the power of concentrated wealth to bear
on office-holders and candidates—national, state, and local—on behalf of special
interests.  Although only a small fraction of these groups promote particular
ideologies or advocate single issues, PACs generally represent the interests of
organizations, such as corporations, labor unions, and trade associations, that are
forbidden by law to contribute or spend directly in federal campaigns.55
The number of corporate PACs increased from 89 in 1974 to 1,327 in 1982.56
There is a direct correlation between campaign spending, electoral success, and
legislative success for the PACs making contributions.  As noted by Judge Wright,
“PAC contributions are given with a legislative purpose and it is a telling fact that they
are most numerous in the more highly regulated industries, such as oil, transportation,
utilities, drugs, health care, and government contracting.”57
Judge Wright further noted that there was a close connection between acceptance
by a legislator of PAC contributions and voting for that PAC’s position on contested
legislation.58  There was also a close correlation between the overall expenditures by
a given campaign and electoral success by the candidate.  In 1978 open-seat senate
campaigns, the candidate who had more to spend on the campaign prevailed in 92.8%
of races.59  As Judge Wright observed, “When wealth of this magnitude is injected into
the political bloodstream, the legislative process itself is affected.”60
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If anything, the importance of money in influencing legislation has only increased
since 1982.  Despite numerous and repeated efforts at campaign finance reform,
corporate money has persisted in injecting itself into politics.  As one Commentator
noted, political money is a “hydraulic” force that will find its way into any crack left
in an attempt to contain it.61  The First Amendment protections for corporate political
speech, as enunciated in Buckley and Bellotti, preclude any attempt to hermetically seal
off politics from money.  Since 1982, the rise of “independent” issue organizations has
led to an even more uncontrolled flow of money from business interests to legislators
via campaign contributions.62  More recently, political journalists have reported on the
direct link between lobbying activities, campaign contributions, and legislative success.
In one case, contributions worth $1 million were sufficient to assure legislative success
for sugar subsidies worth $2 billion annually to the sugar cane industry.63  Money still
buys access, and more.  As Johnny Chung, a businessman and fundraiser for the Demo-
cratic National Committee, put it in the wake of the White House campaign finance
scandals, “[t]he White House is like a subway—you have to put in coins to open the
gates.”64
Though new proposals for campaign finance and ethics reform arise with
regularity,65 few would propose a ban on interest group efforts to influence government
altogether.  Not only would such a ban run afoul of the protections for political speech
afforded by the First Amendment, but it would run afoul of the First Amendment right
to petition as well.  Despite their finding of a strong tilt in pressure group activities in
favor of business interests and contrary to the interests of ordinary citizens and the
disadvantaged, Schlozman and Tierney concluded their study by acknowledging that
this First Amendment right to petition interest is too strong to bear restriction on
lobbying activities: “The burden for maintaining this balance does not, however, fall
to the organized interests.  The right to petition government collectively is so funda-
mental and so constitutionally protected that it cannot be restrained.”66
Schlozman and Tierney recognized the important role of interest groups in per-
forming a communications function between the represented and their representatives in
all three branches of government.  What remains to be seen is how organized interests
influence the three branches of government, and whether access to this influence is equal.
B.   The Twenty-First Century Law Generating Process: Not Your Founding
Fathers’ Separation of Powers
Separation of powers concerns underlie much of the rhetoric of the standing
analysis that concerns this essay.  Often, this separation of powers analysis includes
some attempt to divine the framers’ assumptions concerning the proper role of the
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68. As one text on the administration of statutes describes the process:
High school civics teaches that government is composed of three branches: the legislative
branch that enacts laws, the executive branch that implements and enforces laws enacted by
the legislature, and the judicial branch that adjudicates disputes arising under the common
law and under statutes enacted by the legislature.  Although this is a pleasing and seemingly
complete model, it is overly simplistic. . . .  But the high school civics model breaks down
completely when it comes to administrative or regulatory agencies.  It does not mention
them.  Neither do the federal or state constitutions.  Yet these agencies carry out most of the
day-to-day work of government.  Moreover, they incorporate functions of all three of the
traditional branches of government.  They have a legislative function.  They promulgate
regulations that elaborate on statutes enacted by the legislature and that have the force of
law.  They have an executive function.  They implement and enforce statutes enacted by the
legislature.  And they have a judicial function.  Agency employees sit in judgment on
persons the agency alleges to have violated the statutes they implement.
JEFFREY MILLER, ANN POWERS & NANCY ELDER, INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WATER POLLUTION CONTROL (2008).  
69. Professor Louis Jaffe reconciled the nature of administrative delegation with separation of powers
by describing the legislative, executive, and judicial powers as “poles” rather than boundaries, leaving room
respective branches of government.  Part of the tension underlying the imbalances in
the current law of standing may result from the incompatibility of eighteenth century
political theories with the realities of our twenty-first century system of government.
After their study of the role of interest groups in American government, Schlozman and
Tierney came to the conclusion that Madison’s concerns about majority factions in The
Federalist No. 10 were misplaced: 
The overall thrust of organized interest politics is quite different from that envisioned
by Madison.  He feared tyranny of the majority as the pernicious consequence of
factional politics, arguing that the ordinary operations of democratic procedure would
prevent any minority faction from prevailing.  On the contrary, it seems that the
politics of organized pressure builds into the American system a minoritarian
tendency to counterbalance the more majoritarian proclivities of other parts of the
political process.  In general, organized interest politics tends to facilitate the
articulation of demands by the narrowly interested and well organized.  By and large,
the collectivities thus benefited are well heeled; business, in particular, finds pressure
politics a useful mechanism for pursuing political goals.67
The factions that concerned Madison are not the interest group pressures that
confront the American political system today.  However, the modern law-generating
system is a far cry from the simple process whereby representatives in Washington
draft a bill, vote it into law, and the executive signs it and enforces the terms of the bill
against those subject to its rules that Madison might have envisaged.68  With the dawn
of the administrative state, and with the Supreme Court’s ultimate ratification of the
expansion of the federal regulatory sphere and the delegation of rulemaking authority
to administrative agencies during the New Deal revolution, the function of creating and
validating rules regulating the conduct of industries and economic actors throughout
the American polity has come to involve all three branches of government.  In every
modern regulatory scheme, Congress enacts the underlying statute, which charges an
agency with implementing the statute through regulations having the force of law.
Despite the polar principles of separation of powers,69 adoption of these regulations
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involves substantial policy choices that may benefit some interests and disadvantage
other interests.  Promulgation of regulations is not the last word on the precise
normative rules, as these regulations will always be subject to judicial review, and it
is not until a court has pronounced the rules to be valid or invalid is the matter finally
settled.70
It is no accident that the rise of the administrative state witnessed a concurrent rise
of organized interest groups bringing pressure to bear on each decision point in the
law-generating process.  Indeed, it was part of the premise of the interest group
pluralists that in a complex, modern society, with overlapping and diverging groupings
of political interest, it is only through organized interest groups that the governed can
make their preferences known and consent to regulation.71
1.  Legislation
 Every scheme of regulation begins with a statute.  Of course, statutory formulation
and amendment are the initial focal point for interest group participation.  Interest
groups have several ways of influencing the legislative process.  They may use direct
mail or other public relations measures to provoke letter writing campaigns to
Congress.  Schlozman and Tierney cite the success of a beverage and snack industry
group, the “Calorie Control Council,” in instigating letters of protest against a
proposed Food and Drug Administration ban on saccharin, leading to congressional
action delaying the ban.72  Another example of successful influence of legislation by
an interest group is the chemical industry’s efforts to delay the impending ban on
production of the pesticide methyl bromide, which is both highly toxic and a potent
ozone depletion chemical.73  More fundamentally, interest groups directly influence
electoral outcomes by giving money, publicizing candidates’ voting records,74 and,
more recently, supporting issue-oriented groups.75  The vast bulk of financial support
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for congressional campaigns is funneled through PACs and issue-oriented groups.76
As with interest groups generally, Schlozman and Tierney’s study revealed that the
PAC community was sharply tilted towards business interests, both in the number of
organizations and in dollar contributions.77  In parallel with interest groups generally,
the interests of diffuse publics (i.e., majoritarian interests) were very unevenly
represented in PACs.78  An additional way interest groups influence the legislative
process is to provide direct personal benefits to legislators in the form of free travel,
honoraria, and other perks.79
Of course, interest groups also influence legislative action through the more
traditional forms of “lobbying,” that is, direct meetings with representatives.  One
tactic to increase the effectiveness of such meetings is to enlist an influential consti-
tuent of the congressperson.80  As with other aspects of interest group representation,
Schlozman and Tierney have found that this tactic is much easier for business interests
to use than for public interest organizations representing more diffuse interests.81
Interest groups use contacts with legislators as opportunities to present information
advantageous to their side of issue conflicts.82
The sum total of these efforts to influence legislation is not without effect, as the
above examples demonstrate.83  And, as with interest group activities overall, there is
a distinct balance of resources and outcome-effectiveness favoring the business
interests subject to regulation as opposed to citizens groups that represent the more
diffuse, widely shared communitarian interests of regulatory beneficiaries.
2.  Administrative Rulemaking
Congressional enactment of a regulatory program is hardly the last word when it
comes to establishing binding legal norms.  At least since the social legislation revolu-
tion of the New Deal, Congressional enactments have consisted of broad regulatory
policies, with the specific rules to be developed by agencies given delegated “quasi-
legislative” functions.  Although occasionally Congress may intervene to direct agency
policy on the micro-level,84 in general, the policy choices of implementation are left
394 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2
85. In 1938, Dean Landis described the administrative process as not “simply an extension of executive
power . . . .  In the grant to it of that full ambit of authority necessary for it to plan, to promote, and to
police, it presents an assemblage of rights normally exercisable by government as a whole.”  JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 15 (1938).  The controversy concerning whether administrative
agencies are part of the executive, or are properly considered a fourth branch of government continues to
this day.  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).  One need not resolve this controversy for the purposes of this Article;
the point is that administrative agencies exercise a mix of legislative, executive, and judicial powers that
confounds eighteenth century separation of powers principles, and that their actions—like those of
Congress—are influenced by organized interest groups representing regulated industries.
86. SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 24, at 330-35; see also Eskridge, supra note 44, at 297
(“[P]ublic choice theory teaches that, over time, these agencies and departments are subject to powerful
rent-seeking pressures.”).
87. See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 24, at 328-30.
88. Id. at 329.
89. Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988), revoked by Exec.
Order No. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
90. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986) for an example of the Office of
Management and Budget’s use of Executive Order 12291, on behalf of industry, to hamper EPA’s
implementation of statutory requirements to issue regulations.
91. Exec. Order No. 13,450, 3 C.F.R. 309 (2008).
92. Id. at 310.
93. Id. at 309.
94. SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 24, at 336-37. 
95. David D. Kirkpatrick, Death Knell May Be Near For Public Election Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2007, at A16 (“[T]he presidential candidates will be more beholden than ever to the so-called bundlers,
often lobbyists, who solicit donations to present to campaigns in a lump sum.”).
to an administrative branch of government that is not precisely described in the
constitutional schema of tripartite government.85
As with the Congressional legislative process, the agency legislative process is
subject to influence by organized interest groups.  These groups lobby agency personnel,
participate in rule-making proceedings, provide information to agency staff favorable to
their position, and—most importantly—serve on advisory committees that participate in
formulating agency policy.86  Industry interest groups use the same tactics to influence
presidential policy making that they do to influence congressional policy-making,87
leading Schlozman and Tierney to note “there may be reason to question the notion . . .
that the presidency is a majoritarian institution insulated from pressures by narrow
politics.”88  Implementation of Executive Order number 12,291,89 which expanded the
review powers of the executive Office of Management and Budget, has vastly increased
the direct role of the President in formulating and approving regulations.90  More recently,
former President George W. Bush issued Executive Order number 13,450,91 which
required agency Performance Improvement Officers to, among other duties, “supervise
the performance management activities of the agency.”92  This requirement was added to
“improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Federal Government.”93  In the
meantime, revolving-door arrangements, in which interest groups hire former agency staff
members and place their own employees in influential agency staff positions, allow
interest groups to influence agency policy.94  As public financing for presidential
campaigns becomes more obsolete as candidates are able to raise much more money on
their own, the influence of the largest donors to the candidate can only increase.95
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These revolving-door arrangements have also helped lead to the phenomenon of
agency “capture,” where agencies are substantially influenced by the very industries
they are supposed to regulate.96  Professor Louis Jaffe not only acknowledged this
phenomenon in his 1965 treatise, but also found it an inevitable aspect of administra-
tion that agencies, to accomplish anything, must take the point of view of one interest
over others rather than be representative.97  Though Schlozman and Tierney found the
capture phenomenon to be far from universal in their 1986 study, they note that many
of the same tactics used to influence legislative determinations are used to great effect
by business seeking to influence the administrative process—including the
development of personal relationships, implicit assurances of job opportunities, and
provision of one-sided information.98  Schlozman and Tierney note the example of the
pro-business EPA during the Reagan administration and cite it as an example not of
capture by industry, but rather the “donation” of the agency to the industry by a
deregulatory minded President.99  A similar “donation” of the EPA to industry interests
took place during the George W. Bush administration.100
Schlozman and Tierney concluded that capture theory “sensitiz[es] us to the
possibility that private groups may occasionally acquire positions of great influence in
agency decision-making processes, thus posing a perplexing puzzle for democracy.”101
Professor Cass R. Sunstein observed, more generally, that due to the influence of
organized interests on the administrative process, statutes “that involve diffuse and
numerous beneficiaries and well-organized regulated classes . . . tend to be
inadequately enforced.”102
3.  Interest Groups and the Judiciary
Interest groups influence the judicial process both directly, by bringing impact
litigation and filing amicus briefs, and indirectly, by seeking to influence judicial
appointments and by proselytizing judges to their point of view.103  Several
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commentators have suggested that the same imbalance of resources that favor business
interests in the two more political branches of government garners advantages in the
judicial branch as well.104  
Nevertheless, in many cases the courts have proven more receptive to the efforts
of economically and politically disadvantaged minorities than Congress and the
administrative agencies.  Ideologically motivated organizations have waged successful
campaigns in the area of civil rights, non-discrimination, and environmental protection.
The NAACP orchestrated and supported litigation striking down racially based
restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer105 as well as the landmark decision ending
segregation in public schools in Brown v. Board of Education.106  Even before the
environmental revolution took statutory form in the 1970s, groups such as Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference won the right to sue to assert environmental interests
and required the Federal Power Commission to take environmental values into account
in performing its general “public interest” review of a power plant licensing.107
Ideologically motivated organizations also played an important role in
representing the interests of the benefited community in implementation of the
environmental statutes adopted during the 1970s.  Most of the cases forcing the EPA
to issue regulations required under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act were
brought by the NRDC.108  
The Supreme Court has recognized the important role that organized groups
representing broad public interests play in bringing balance to the arguments and issues
presented to the judiciary.  This recognition has been grounded in the right to petition
guaranteed by the First Amendment.  In International Union v. Brock,109 the Court
explained the rationale for organizational standing in terms of the advantages to the
judiciary of competent presentation of the issues:
The Secretary’s presentation, however, fails to recognize the special features,
advantageous both to the individuals represented and to the judicial system as a
whole, that distinguish suits by associations on behalf of their members from class
actions.  While a class action creates an ad hoc union of injured plaintiffs who may
be linked only by their common claims, an association suing to vindicate the interests
of its members can draw upon a pre-existing reservoir or expertise and capital.
“Besides financial resources, organizations often have specialized expertise and
research resources relating to the subject matter of the lawsuit that individual
plaintiffs lack.”  These resources can assist both courts and plaintiffs.  As one court
observed of an association’s role in pending litigation: “[The] interest and expertise
of this plaintiff, when exerted on behalf of its directly affected members, assure ‘that
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concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult . . . questions.’”
In addition, the doctrine of associational standing recognizes that the primary
reason people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for
vindicating interests that they share with others.110
Justice Jackson, concurring in Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, observed
that “[t]he only practical judicial policy when people pool their capital, their interests,
or their activities under a name and form that will identify collective interests, often is
to permit the association or corporation in a single case to vindicate the interests of
all.” 111
The Court similarly commented favorably on the role organized groups play in
asserted interests not vindicated in the other branches of government in NAACP v.
Button: “Groups which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the
ballot frequently turn to the courts . . . and under the conditions of modern government,
litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for
redress of grievances.” 112  In recognizing this link between the petition right and group
litigation activity, Justice Brennan’s opinion for the court cited, among other sources,
some of the same interest group theorists that led the interest group pluralists.113  As
Professors Birkby and Murphy observed shortly after the decision:
[t]his decision represents one of the few times in all Supreme Court history when the
Justices have plainly and candidly admitted that they play a key role in the struggle
among interest groups to shape public policy, that even though they are judges in the
common law tradition they are nevertheless participants in the political process.114
In summary, as our republican form of self-government has evolved into the
twenty-first century, well-financed narrow interests, namely business interests, exert
a strong influence in the legislature through campaign contributions that buy access and
lobbying efforts that convert this access into action.  Broad public interests and the
interests of the economically disadvantaged are less influential in the legislature.  The
business and regulated community similarly exerts influence on the agency rulemaking
process by bringing its resources to bear on provision of favorable information, by
influencing the process of appointing agency personnel and OMB review of rules, and
by developing personal relationships and a pattern of revolving-door employment
practices.  Public interest and civil rights groups have had more success asserting their
interests in the judicial branch of government.  Nevertheless, standing doctrine may
limit the kinds of cases that public interest, ideological plaintiff-organizations can
assert in court, with profound implications for the nature of judicial review of the
administrative rulemaking process.
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IV.   THE IMPORTANCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND THE STANDING
HURDLES FACED BY IDEOLOGICAL PLAINTIFFS SEEKING REVIEW
In their study of how interest groups influence government, Professors Schlozman
and Tierney observed that “virtually every regulation issued by such agencies as the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration is challenged in court either by environmental and consumer groups,
or by industry.”115  Additionally, Professor Louis Jaffe opined that “[t]he availability
of judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically, if not logically, of a
system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”116
Although Professor Jaffe commented on the widely shared social expectation in our
system of government, that the judiciary will be the final arbiter of disputes about the
appropriate implementation of statutory mandates, this expectation is rooted also in the
constitutional limits, however weak, on delegation of rulemaking authority.  Professor
Cass Sunstein observed that “the basic presumption is in favor of review—an idea that
draws on constitutional concerns and fears about agency failure.”117  In commenting
on the normative effect public choice theory might have, Professor Eskridge points to
a role for the judiciary in counterbalancing the interest-dominated choices made by
legislatures and agencies.118
Thus, the idea of judicial review as the last step in the process of generating
binding rules with “the force of law” is firmly established among legal scholars.
Statutory regulatory schemes incorporate an assumption of judicial review of agency
implementation, and indeed may seek to accelerate judicial review in order to provide
certainty and uniformity.  By and large, the judiciary has accommodated itself to the
role of rulemaking review, but with some important qualifications on the scope of that
review.  Nevertheless, the law of judicial standing imposes different standards for
access to judicial review for regulatory beneficiaries and regulatory objects, potentially
skewing the results of the administrative process in favor of the very interests—
organized business interests—that we have seen are more advantageously represented
in the administrative rulemaking process.
A.  Constitutional Basis for Judicial Review
The premise underlying the administrative state—that Congress could delegate to
agencies the authority to adopt rules, with the force of law, governing conduct—has
long been accepted.119  In 1825, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, “Congress may
certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise
itself.”120  The Supreme Court, throughout the early history of our nation, has allowed
incrementally greater grants of rulemaking power to the executive branch, generally
rejecting arguments based on an implicit constitutional prohibition against the
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delegation of legislative power: from early statutes authorizing the President to suspend
an embargo against France and Britain upon a determination that those nations ceased
to violate the United States’ neutral commerce,121 to the establishment of “free lists”
of goods free from duties,122 to the establishment of minimum quality standards for
imported tea,123 to the establishment of rules for the use of National Forest lands
carrying criminal penalties.124
Nevertheless, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Court declared that
the power to delegate legislative functions is not limitless.125  Decided in 1935,
Schechter established the existence of residual constitutional limits on the scope and
freedom of delegation of rulemaking authority.126  Congress must incorporate some
reference to a standard governing the formulation of rules, and may not delegate to the
agency a “roving commission to inquire into evils and upon discovery correct them.”127
The Schechter Court invalidated a portion of the National Industrial Recovery Act128
that authorized the National Recovery Administration to establish rules for “fair
competition” for various industries, including the poultry industry, as a means to
promote business activity and recover from the Great Depression.129
No case since Schechter has invalidated a delegation of rulemaking authority, but
the principle it established—that there is some outer limit to the scope of permissible
delegation—necessarily implies a constitutional role of judicial review of rulemaking
activity.  The constitutional mandate for judicial review has been asserted as a
fundamental aspect of the nature of the judicial authority.130  This “judicial function”
view echoes Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in Marbury v. Madison that “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.”131  The mandate for judicial review is also rooted in the Fifth Amendment
guarantee against deprivations of liberty or property without due process.  Under this
view, the right of judicial review of the system of rules under which a deprivation takes
place is part of the process that is due.  As Professor Jaffe stated, “We can then
conclude that, when a person is the object of an administrative order which will be
enforced by a writ levying upon his property or his person, he is at some point entitled
to a judicial test of legality.”132  Such review is constitutionally necessary to ensure
both that the delegation itself falls within the outer bounds established in Schechter and
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that the rulemaking activity itself falls within the bounds of the permissible
delegation.133
The Court’s most recent consideration of a delegation challenge to rulemaking,
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,134 was premised on both of these assumptions.
In American Trucking, the Court found that the Clean Air Act direction to the EPA to
establish national ambient air quality standards at a level “requisite to protect public
health” was a sufficiently intelligible principle to survive a delegation challenge; at the
same time the Court upheld EPA’s establishment of a health-based fine particulate
level that would cause severe economic impacts to the trucking industry.135
B.  Congressionally Expressed Presumptions of Judicial Review
Cases such as American Trucking, which assume the underlying constitutional
necessity of judicial review of the scope and exercise of delegated rulemaking
authority, are based on statutory judicial review procedures that are now part of the
underlying legal landscape.  The 1946 Administrative Procedure Act reflected a basic
presumption of reviewability of all final administrative action:136
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law
committed to agency discretion— . . . [a]ny person suffering legal wrong because of
an agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the
meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.137
“Agency action” subject to such review, is defined to include the issuance of any agency
“rule,” which is defined as “any agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”138  In
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,139 the Supreme Court held that the Administrative
Procedure Act specifically authorized immediate, pre-enforcement review of agency
rulemaking, subject only to justiciability limits of ripeness and standing.140
Congress has made immediate judicial review of regulations an explicit element
in many regulatory schemes.  These statutory provisions not only acknowledge the
inevitability of judicial review of rulemaking, but also seek to provide certainty and
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uniformity by establishing terms for judicial review.  For example, in the environ-
mental arena, the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, each contain provisions requiring any challenge to certain kinds of rule-
making be brought within a short period after promulgation and in the case of rules
with nationwide application requiring that challenges be commenced in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.141  These statutes preclude the later
assertion of a challenge to the validity of regulations—for example, in an enforcement
proceeding.  Similarly, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provides that a
judicial review proceeding be commenced in the Court of Appeals within ninety days
of promulgation of regulations pursuant to specified sections of the Act.142  The Civil
Service Reform Act provides for judicial review, to be commenced in the Court of
Appeals, of a final order under the act within sixty days of the issuance of the order.143
Congress has also accommodated the near universality of judicial review of
rulemaking actions by amending the Judicial Code to address the problem of multiple
actions challenging the same rulemaking in different circuit courts.  Under prior
practice, the first petition filed for review of a particular rulemaking action determined
the forum of review; which led to highly contested “races to the courthouse” to be the
first to file a judicial review proceeding in a circuit deemed favorable to the particular
interest group filing suit.144  The winner of the race was often determined based on a
difference in filing-time measured in fractions of seconds.145  In 1988, Congress
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2112 to provide equal status for all petitions filed within ten days
of publication of a rule in the Federal Register.146  The amendment further provided
that the choice of circuit would be determined by lottery from among the petitions
filed.147
Thus, Congress has encouraged and accommodated immediate post-promulgation
review of administrative rulemaking.
C.   Judicial Acceptance of Review of Rulemaking
Although the concept of pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rulemaking
immediately upon adoption of a final rule might once have been considered
problematic in terms of justiciability, the Abbott Laboratories case accepted the
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proposition that the benefits of immediate review provided for by the Administrative
Procedure Act overcame justiciability concerns.148  In some ways, the decision in
Abbott Laboratories represents a triumph of the “judicial function” premise of judicial
review over the “Fifth Amendment Due Process” premise.  After all, the Fifth
Amendment is generally satisfied by the opportunity to raise legal objections to the
rules in question at the time of their enforcement.
Abbott Laboratories involved a challenge by pharmaceutical manufacturers to a
Food and Drug Administration regulation requiring all drug labels to bear the generic
name for the drug each and every time the trade name appeared.149  Although the
underlying statute did not include the regulation in question among the categories for
which it provided for immediate judicial review, the Court nevertheless found the
regulations immediately reviewable as a final agency action under the Administrative
Procedure Act.150  While accepting the proposition of immediate judicial review of
regulations, the Court did impose a ripeness test on the availability of immediate
review: the petitioner would have to show some hardship if review was deferred and
that the questions presented are suitable to be determined via a facial challenge to the
regulations (as opposed to the concrete factual circumstances of an enforcement
challenge).151  In Abbott Laboratories, the pharmaceutical companies sufficiently
established hardship based on either the cost of reprinting labels for existing drug
stocks to comply with the regulation or the risks of criminal penalties, civil forfeitures,
and penalties if they chose to test the regulation by non-compliance.152  In addition, the
Court found that the nature of the issue presented was suitable for immediate judicial
review as “all parties agree[d] that the issue tendered [wa]s a purely legal one: whether
the statute [had been] properly construed by the Commissioner to require the
established name of the drug to be used every time the proprietary name is
employed.”153
Since Abbott Laboratories, immediate judicial review of rulemaking actions has
become routine and judicially accepted as the norm.  Relatively few cases have
declined review of final substantive agency regulations by applying the “ripeness”
criteria upon which the Court conditioned immediate review.154  Courts have found the
“hardship” criterion satisfied by procedural injuries155 and the risk of environmental
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harm.156  As noted above, Congress has specifically provided for immediate judicial
review of specified categories of regulations.  The Supreme Court has opined that such
statutes permit “judicial review directly, even before the concrete effects normally
required for APA review are felt.”157  Other federal courts have found such specific
congressional mandates for prompt judicial review to be dispositive of the ripeness
inquiry.158
Of course, judicial acceptance of routine immediate judicial review of regulations
is a different question from the scope of that review.  Hand-in-hand with judicial
acceptance of the notion that Congress may delegate substantive rulemaking authority
comes a measure of deference to administrative policy choices within the scope of the
substantive delegation.  Thus, as Professor Henry Monaghan has observed, the
province of the Courts in a system of judicial review of administrative rulemaking
becomes less the duty to declare “what the law is” and more a duty to determine
whether the particular agency rules and policy choices fall within the scope of the
authority delegated by Congress.  According to Monaghan, “the judicial duty is to
ensure that the administrative agency stays within the zone of discretion committed to
it by its organic act.”159  The Supreme Court has itself adopted this definition of the
role of courts through the Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC160 doctrine of administrative
deference.  Under Chevron, an agency interpretation of law will be binding on the
courts if the congress has not directly spoken to the contrary on the issue in the
underlying statute, and if the agency interpretation is a reasonable interpretation of the
statutory scheme.161  For Chevron deference to apply, the court must still determine
that the action in question was taken pursuant to a congressional grant of substantive
rulemaking authority.162
Thus, courts have accepted the routine practice of immediate judicial review of
agency rulemaking, but have also adopted a deferential standard of review that leaves
the policy choices to the agencies.  It bears noting that in adopting this deferential
standard of review in Chevron, the Court invoked rhetoric that is reminiscent of the
separation of powers and political accountability concerns that, we shall see, also
underlie standing doctrine.  According to the Chevron Court, deference to agency
policy choices is appropriate in part because:
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the
basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences.  In contrast, an agency to which
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Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy
to inform its judgments.  Though agencies are not directly accountable to the people,
the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved
by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities.  When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge
must fail.  In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.  The responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between
competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: “Our Constitution vests
such responsibilities in the political branches.”163
D.  The Problem of Standing for Regulatory Beneficiaries
Immediate judicial review of substantive rulemaking has thus become the rule
rather than the exception.  Yet access to the mechanisms of judicial review is not
afforded equally to regulatory objects and regulatory beneficiaries.  Though the
judiciary routinely overcomes the justiciability concerns of ripeness doctrine, standing
issues continue to pose a differential hurdle to organizational plaintifffs seeking to
protect the interests and visions of the broad beneficiaries of regulatory programs.  The
Supreme Court’s standing doctrine frankly discriminates against such interests:
[T]he nature and extent of facts that must be . . . [proved] in order to establish
standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the
action (or forgone action) at issue.  If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the
action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring
the action will redress it. . . .  [W]hen the plaintiff is not himself the object of the
government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is
ordinarily “substantially more difficult” to establish.164
Thus, organizational plaintiffs have been precluded from challenging rulemaking
actions that compromised statutory interests in endangered species,165 wilderness
areas,166 or the environmental impacts of hazardous waste disposal.167
Ordinarily, under the regime established by Sierra Club v. Morton168 and Hunt v.
Washington Apple Advertising Commission,169 a plaintiff-organization must establish
standing in a representational capacity by identifying a specific member, or members,
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who would suffer the requisite injury-in-fact.170  Although this structure works fairly
well when organizations seek to challenge specific projects or specific activities that
harm specific interests,171 this structure breaks down when confronted by a typical
rulemaking challenge.  Rulemaking establishes norms and requirements for conduct
that will apply into the indefinite future; unlike the organization challenging a specific
project in a specific location, there is no way of telling at the time a rule is adopted
who will ultimately be affected by a rule of general applicability.  A rule that has the
effect of decreasing the availability of cancer drugs, for example, affects the interests
of those known regulatory beneficiaries who have been diagnosed with cancer;
however, it also will affect the interests of countless people who have not yet been
diagnosed with cancer but who will nevertheless be affected by the rule sometime in
the future.172  Similarly, a rule relaxing the safety requirements for the licensing of
nuclear power plants affects the interests of people residing in the vicinity of nuclear
power plants yet to be proposed, who cannot possibly tell at the time of the rulemaking
that they have an interest that will be affected.173  So too, a rulemaking that declines to
list certain wastes as “hazardous,” thereby not requiring disposal in carefully controlled
permitting facilities, immediately affects the interests of those who reside near existing
non-hazardous waste disposal facilities, as well as the interests of all those unknown
persons who may have a waste disposal facility sited near their residences in the future,
or who may move into a neighborhood with an existing facility.174
Under these circumstances, the process of challenging rulemaking is necessarily
representative and advisory.  That is, the plaintiff bringing the immediate challenge to
the rulemaking is acting on behalf of all future parties who will be similarly situated,
and whose interests will be affected by future application of the rule.175  While the
organizational plaintiffs who bring the challenges are often successful in locating
individual representative members for standing purposes, the benefits to these indivi-
duals rarely justify the level of effort required by the litigation.  Such organizational
plaintiffs thus fall into the category of “ideological plaintiffs.”  Such litigation is
advisory in nature, as the purpose is to establish the legal rules that will apply in the
future to protect the interests of persons with interests similar to those individuals with
standing in the present case.
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Statutes providing for immediate review of rulemaking add to the imperative for
these immediate judicial challenges by regulatory beneficiaries.  These statutes were
designed to provoke a prompt and conclusive judicial determination of the validity of
complex regulatory programs, and, accordingly contain provisions limiting or
precluding later judicial review.  For example, the Clean Water Act provides, “Action
of the Administrator [of EPA] with respect to which review could have been obtained
under paragraph 1 of this subsection [requiring a petition for review within 120 days
of promulgation] shall not be subject to judicial review in any civil or criminal
proceeding for enforcement.”176
The Clean Air Act judicial review provision similarly provides, “Nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to authorize judicial review of regulations or orders of the
Administrator under this chapter, except as provided in this section.”177  Immediate
review at the behest of regulatory beneficiaries under these sections takes on an
imperative.  Seeking such review is not simply an altruistic favor to unknown persons
who will be affected in the future; rather it may be the only chance that regulatory
beneficiaries have to argue their view of statutory requirements.  The rights of future
regulatory beneficiaries may be prejudiced by the failure or insufficiency of a challenge
to regulations at the time they are promulgated.
To be sure, some courts have recognized challenges “as applied” to regulations
long after the limitations period has expired.178  Under these cases, a regulatory
beneficiary may file a petition seeking amendment or rescission of the challenged
regulation, then commence a suit under the Administrative Procedure Act challenging
the denial of the rescission petition.179  However, there are reasons that such a deferred
challenge does not put a regulatory beneficiary on the same footing as the regulatory
object who is permitted to seek judicial review immediately upon promulgation of the
regulation.  Administrative interpretations become entrenched with time.  Courts
routinely give greater deference to a “longstanding” agency interpretation of the
statute.180  Parties subject to regulation take actions in reliance on a regulatory scheme,
and courts are unlikely to upset the settled expectations and investment-backed
expectations of the regulated community to accommodate a challenge brought years
after a regulation was adopted.
In 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
decided American Petroleum Institute (API) v. EPA,181 wherein various parties
challenged EPA orders listing certain petroleum industry wastes as “hazardous.”182
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The final rule was challenged both by petroleum industry trade associations, which
objected to the wastes that were listed as “hazardous,” and by environmental
organizations, which objected to the wastes that were not listed as hazardous.183
Without so much as mentioning standing, ripeness, or justiciability issues, the D.C.
Circuit considered the industry challenges on the merits and vacated and remanded the
portion of the rule that designated oil-bearing wastewaters as hazardous waste.184  At
the same time, the court dismissed the environmental challengers’ claims, holding that
they had no standing to challenge EPA’s refusal to list oily storage tank residues as a
hazardous waste.185  The court rejected the environmental petitioners’ standing even
though the Sierra Club had submitted affidavits from members who lived close to non-
hazardous waste landfills, and expert analyses that showed that those landfills received
tank bottoms waste.186  According to the D.C. Circuit, the environmental petitioners
would have to establish that oily wastes had in fact contaminated the groundwater near
these landfills to show standing.187  Even though the environmental petitioners included
an affidavit from a member who had stopped canoeing in a bayou near one of the
affected landfills because of pollution of the bayou, as well as an affidavit from a
geophysicist attesting to the fact that oil residues had escaped into the bayou, the court
found this chain of injury lacking, as “neither affiant traces the pollution of concern to
[storage tank] waste.”188
Other cases in the Courts of Appeals present similar disparities: industry
challenges to agency rulemaking are considered on the merits while challenges by
regulatory beneficiaries to the exact same rule, in the exact same case, are rejected
because the organizations representing the beneficiaries cannot identify a member who
would certainly be harmed.  For example, the Fifth Circuit considered industry
challenges to the EPA “mega rule” governing use and disposal of materials containing
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), while simultaneously refusing to consider the Sierra
Club’s challenge to the same rule.189  In another case, the Seventh Circuit also rejected
the NRDC’s standing to challenge Clean Water Act general permits for storm-water
discharges, on grounds that it could not show individual members who would definitely
be harmed by such permits; however, the court allowed a challenge to the same general
permits by industry representatives to proceed.190  The D.C. Circuit has since
formalized this disparity in standing analysis, announcing that petitioners in rule-
challenge proceedings must submit affidavits establishing their standing along with
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their petition unless their standing to challenge the rule is “self evident” (i.e., they are
regulatory objects as opposed to beneficiaries).191
The API case illustrates the disparity in standing to seek review of rulemaking
between industry groups and the broader public who are the beneficiaries of regulation.192
Industry challenges are heard, considered, and granted, while the claims of environmental
beneficiaries are ignored despite their efforts to provide expert testimony linking
individual concerns and injuries to the generally applicable regulations challenged.  The
net differential effect of standing doctrine is glaringly apparent in API: the regulations that
industry objects to are struck down, while the regulations that the beneficiaries object to
cannot even be challenged.  Someone will be harmed by the EPA’s refusal to list storage-
tank sludges as a hazardous waste requiring careful treatment.  The Sierra Club was in a
good position to assert the interests of the persons harmed and devoted all of the
resources necessary to argue the issue on the merits.  The members it located for standing
purposes, deemed unworthy by the court, were merely representative plaintiffs in any
case, standing in for the entire class of persons known and unknown who would be
harmed by disposing of oil-tank sludges in ordinary landfills.  Yet their claim was not
heard, and if a plaintiff with a direct, palpable harm from the EPA policy comes before
the court in ten years seeking redress, she will face the judicial and administrative inertia
represented by ten years of “settled” rules concerning the appropriate disposition of tank
sludges.
This differential impact of standing doctrine is most obvious in a case such as API,
where the direct result is to grant relief to the regulatory objects and deny it to the
beneficiaries; however, the differential grant of standing has fundamental and insidious
impacts on the law-generating process as well.  Government agencies do not want to
spend time and resources defending regulations in court.  If one side of the regulatory
equation generally has standing to sue, and the other side does not, agencies are likely
to favor the side that can sue them in their rulemaking decisions to avoid the
expenditure of resources necessary to defend regulations in court, the negative
publicity, and disappointment inherent in having regulations struck down.193  Thus,
current standing doctrine reinforces the advantage industry groups already enjoy in the
legislative and administrative sectors of the rulemaking process.
E.  The Special Problem of Probabilistic Harms
Modern regulation concerns itself with reducing risks.194  Regulation of exposure
to workplace hazards, reactions to food additives, side effects of drugs, and
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environmental exposure to toxins all represent attempts to control factors that may be
unlikely to cause discernible harm to any particular individual, but may be likely to
cause harm to many individuals in a large population exposed to the factor.  For
example, in API, in assessing whether wastestreams should be “hazardous,” the EPA
used a risk threshold: if the risk of cancer death was one in 100,000, the waste was “an
initial candidate” for listing, but if the risk was one in 10,000, the waste was
“presumptively assumed” to merit listing as “hazardous.”195  The intended beneficiaries
of these risk-controlling statutes are the persons who might otherwise be injured.
Representation of the interests of these probabilistic regulatory beneficiaries poses
a peculiar problem under standing doctrine.  Standing for regulatory beneficiaries
requires a plaintiff who is “himself among the injured.”196  But in the case of
probabilistic harms, it may be impossible to know at the time regulations are relaxed
just who is “among the injured.”
Not surprisingly, the tension between a regulatory system that on its face seeks to
protect against probabilistic harms to the population at large and a standing doctrine
based on individual rights and interests has led to differing results in the federal courts.
Several courts have recognized “probabilistic” standing on the part of organizations
that can show they have enough members subject to the risk to make it likely that some
of their members will suffer, or even on behalf of individuals exposed to the risk.
Some courts have accepted that a probabilistic harm may constitute a sufficiently
significant injury-in-fact to satisfy standing requirements for an individual plaintiff.
These courts have reasoned that where the magnitude of the harm is sufficiently grave,
even a very small probability of occurrence may satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.
Most recently, the Supreme Court rejected organizational standing based on a
probabilistic argument that individual members of an organizational plaintiff would
suffer procedural harms in the future.197
1.  Baur and Increased Individual Risk
In 2003, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a district court dismissal of a
challenge to a Department of Agriculture regulation allowing sale of meat from
“downed” livestock to be sold for human consumption, posing a small threat to all
meat consumers of contracting variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), an incurable
and invariably fatal disease.198  The court reasoned: 
Because the evaluation of risk is qualitative, the probability of harm which a plaintiff
must demonstrate in order to allege a cognizable injury-in-fact logically varies with
the severity of the probable harm.  In this case, Baur alleges that downed cattle may
transmit vCJD, a deadly disease with no known cure or treatment.  Thus, even a
moderate increase in the risk of disease may be sufficient to confer standing.199
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Baur built on cases upholding the standing of persons with interests in specific
environmental resources to enforce environmental norms designed to protect those
specific resources.200  However, Baur represents a step beyond these cases of plaintiffs
asserting interests in specific environmental resources.  There is a qualitative difference
between a plaintiff asserting a statutory violation with probabilistic or inchoate effects
on a specific environmental resource in which he has a proven interest, and an
increased risk shared by the population at large generally, such as the safety of the food
supply.
2.  Methyl Bromide and Aggregating Probabilistic Injuries
Thus, Baur recognized an individual injury-in-fact based on a vanishingly small
increased risk to the individual, but with grave consequences.  The D.C. Circuit took
a more association-oriented approach in the more recent case of NRDC v. EPA (Methyl
Bromide).201  NRDC challenged an EPA regulation exempting methyl bromide, an
ozone disrupting chemical, from the ban of the Montreal Protocol.202  Although the
EPA did not challenge NRDC’s standing, the industry intervenors did.  NRDC
presented statistical evidence establishing that some of its 500,000 members would be
likely to contract fatal cancers as a result of the incremental ultraviolet exposure caused
by continued use of methyl bromide, and some larger number would contract non-fatal
skin cancers.  The D.C. Circuit panel initially dismissed the petition, finding the annual
risk to NRDC’s members to be too vanishingly small to be a cognizable injury-in-
fact.203  On rehearing, in light of an EPA statistician’s affidavit stating that the court’s
attempt to annualize the risk was invalid, the court reversed itself and found that
NRDC had standing based on the aggregate risk to all of its members:
The parties vigorously dispute whether we were correct to hold as a quantitative
matter that NRDC’s alleged injury was trivial or whether, in NRDC’s words, any
“scientifically demonstrable increase in the threat of death or serious illness,” . . . .
On reconsideration, we have determined that the question is one we do not have to
answer in this case.  EPA’s expert, who built the quantitative model on which both
sides rely, now informs us that “[e]xpressing the risk in annualized terms is not
practical” and “it is more appropriate to express the risk as a population’s cumulative
or lifetime risk.” . . .  The lifetime risk that an individual will develop nonfatal skin
cancer as a result of EPA’s rule is about 1 in 200,000 by the intervenor’s lights . . . .
Even if a quantitative approach is appropriate—an issue on which we express no
opinion—this risk is sufficient to support standing.  One may infer from the statistical
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analysis that two to four of NRDC’s nearly half a million members will develop
cancer as a result of the rule.204
There is an important difference between the approach in Methyl Bromide and the
one taken by the Second Circuit in Baur.  In Baur, the court accepted a small
incremental risk of fatal illness as sufficient to support standing for that individual.  In
Methyl Bromide, the court seemed to suggest that the risk to any single individual is
too small to support standing, but that the near certainty that two to four of NRDC’s
half-million members will develop cancer is enough to support standing for the
organization.
Some members of NRDC will certainly be harmed by the methyl bromide
regulation, and the D.C. Circuit accepted this harm as sufficient to support standing.
The problem is that neither NRDC, nor the court, can identify those members.  Thus,
NRDC has standing to challenge the methyl bromide exception as an organization,
although no single member would have a sufficiently significant increase in cancer risk
to challenge the regulation in her own right.  This synergistic approach to standing
injuries is at odds with the usual formulation of representational standing, which
requires the organization to identify a member who would have standing as an
individual.205  This aggregation of risk encapsulates the problem faced by regulatory
beneficiaries seeking to challenge agency rules: someone will be harmed by the
regulation, but it is impossible at the outset to determine who.
The D.C. Circuit’s acceptance of an alchemy of aggregate harm to satisfy the
injury-in-fact element of standing analysis, like the Second Circuit’s acceptance of a
vanishingly small individual risk, may represent a judicial attempt to even out the
opportunities for rulemaking challenges by regulatory beneficiaries.206  Certainly, there
are many other cases where courts have considered rulemaking challenges on the
merits at the behest of regulatory beneficiaries with little or no inquiry into standing,
despite the steep threshold suggested by the Supreme Court’s standing rhetoric.207  
3.  The Supreme Court’s Disinclination to Accept Aggregation of 
Interdependent Harms
The D.C. Circuit’s aggregation of group risks in Methyl Bromide seems to run
headlong not only into the Supreme Court’s rhetoric about identifying an individual
organization member with standing in their own right, but also into dictum from the
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Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in ASARCO v. Kadish,208 wherein the Court stated
that “the doctrine of standing to sue is not a kind of gaming device that can be
surmounted merely by aggregating the allegations of different kinds of plaintiffs, each
of whom may have claims that are remote or speculative taken by themselves.”209  The
Court’s plurality opinion would have denied standing to a teachers’ association and a
taxpayers’ association in their challenge to mineral leases said to shortchange the
Arizona’s land-grant education fund.210  Moreover, the plurality reasoned that the
injury to the teachers’ association was speculative, as there was no assurance that
increased revenues to the education fund would result in increased spending on salaries
and resources for teachers.211  Likewise, the plurality rejected the taxpayers’ standing
on the grounds that any reduction in taxes as a result of increased revenues was also
speculative.212 
More recently, the Supreme Court more emphatically rejected the possibility of
using probabilistic harms to establish standing, at least in the case of alleged
procedural injuries and on a record that did not establish a factual basis for the
probabilistic analysis.  In Summers v. Earth Island Institute,213 the Court reversed a
finding that Earth Island Institute and the Sierra Club had standing to challenge Forest
Service procedural regulations limiting the opportunity of the public to comment on
certain timber sales on federal lands.  By the time of the appeal, the environmental
plaintiffs could point to no specific timber sale affecting specific National Forest lands
used by specifically identified individual members.  Responding to the dissent’s
suggestion that among Sierra Club’s 700,000 members who enjoyed use of National
Forest lands there were certainly individuals who would be affected by the regulation,
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion rejected probabilistic analysis in lieu of identifying
specific individual members: “This novel approach to the law of organizational
standing would make a mockery of our prior cases, which have required plaintiff-
organizations to make specific allegations establishing that at least one identified
member had suffered or would suffer harm.”214
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The Summers case arose in the eccentric circumstances of procedural injury, and
the record lacked factual proof of the likely injuries of the organizations’ members.
Similarly, ASARCO arose in a different context than the aggregation of individual risks
of the many similarly-situated individuals in the Methyl Bromide case.  The ASARCO
plurality opinion dealt with aggregation of different kinds of conditional harms—
higher taxes versus decreased educational resources—by “different kinds of
plaintiffs.”215  The ASARCO plurality’s dictum and the Summers decision both
nevertheless suggest a hostility to this kind of aggregation on the part of the Supreme
Court.  Yet this sort of aggregation of individually insignificant risks of harm may be
the only way that regulatory beneficiaries’ interests may be considered by the federal
judiciary.  The question remains whether there is some interest that might successfully
compete with the courts’ justiciability concerns, allowing people to assemble their
interests and successfully petition the courts for redress of their perceived grievances.
But first, a more focused inquiry into the Supreme Court’s reasoning and justifications
for standing doctrine is in order.
V.  STANDING JURISPRUDENCE AND ARTICLES III & II
So far, this Article has examined how judicial review by an Article III court has
become an essential step in the legislative process.  This review is usually provided by
statute and is likely of constitutional dimension, at least as far as regulatory objects are
concerned, and likely for regulatory beneficiaries as well.  Differential access to
judicial review for different regulatory viewpoints will necessarily have an impact on
substantive policy—if only regulatory objects who seek less regulation have access to
courts and regulatory beneficiaries who seek more regulation are excluded, then, in the
long run, the legislative trend will be towards less regulation.  Agencies will be more
reluctant to issue strict regulations that can be challenged in court, than to issue more
lenient regulations that cannot.  Courts will more frequently strike down regulations
as too strict rather than too lenient, simply because they reach the merits of more cases
challenging regulations in this manner.
Yet this differential result is precisely what current standing doctrine, with its
requirement of injury-in-fact accomplishes.  Regulatory objects—usually business
interests—are presumed to have sustained an injury-in-fact through their loss of profits
and their loss of freedom to act without restraint.  Regulatory beneficiaries, on the
other hand—those who stand to benefit from environmental or consumer or health
protections—must establish specific individual harm to cross the threshold to judicial
review.  Because many of the benefits provided by regulation are probabilistic, long-
term, or generally shared “public rights,” ideological plaintiffs often fail to establish
the “particularized injury” required by standing doctrine for adjudication.
A.  The Irreducible Elements of Standing, as Currently Understood
Standing doctrine addresses the “who” of the litigation process.  It limits the
identity of plaintiffs who may challenge government action or inaction, or even private
action alleged to violate statutory norms.  Although courts originally crafted the
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standing threshold to limit individual constitutional challenges to governmental action,
the doctrine has expanded to limit statutory challenges to agency action (and inaction)
and to restrict the sorts of cases that Congress might authorize private litigants to
undertake against other private actors, particularly in the area of enforcement of
environmental laws.
As a doctrine of purported constitutional genesis, standing as a distinct aspect of
Article III justiciability is of relatively recent vintage.  Standing as an element of
justiciability is traced to 1923 when the Supreme Court decided Frothingham v.
Mellon,216 which rejected the justiciability of a challenge by both a federal taxpayer
and the State of Massachusetts to the constitutionality of the Maternity Act of 1921.217
The Maternity Act provided for federal aid to states upon condition that the states
implement federally prescribed programs to protect maternal health.218  The Court’s
discussion of the justiciability issue foreshadows current standing doctrine, with its
emphasis on injury-in-fact to the plaintiff, as well as its differential recognition of
standing for regulatory objects and regulatory beneficiaries:
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that
they are unconstitutional.  That question may be considered only when the justifica-
tion for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is
made to rest upon such an act.  Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining and
declaring the law applicable to the controversy.  It amounts to little more than the
negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment, which otherwise would
stand in the way of the enforcement of a legal right.  The party who invokes the power
must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or
is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with
people generally.219
This passage presages the injury-in-fact requirement by its reference to “some direct
injury,”220 and also presages possible differential treatment of regulatory objects in its
characterization of the power of judicial review as “little more than the negative power
to disregard an unconstitutional enactment.”
This standing threshold was and is framed in terms of the Article III grant of
judicial power to hear “cases and controversies.”221  Although the text of Article III
says nothing to limit the identity of appropriate litigants in federal court, the Supreme
Court has found such limits to inhere in the very nature of the judicial function, implicit
in the terms “cases” or “controversies.”  The Court has come to focus on injury to an
individual right—injury-in-fact—as the irreducible quintessence of justiciable “cases”
or “controversies.”  Some Supreme Court opinions, and a well-read article authored
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by then-Judge Antonin Scalia, also anchor the standing requirement in separation of
powers concerns;222 specifically, that the courts not improperly interfere with the
executive branch’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”223
As currently stated (and oft-repeated), to have standing to commence an action,
a plaintiff must (1) suffer an injury-in-fact that is (2) causally related to the action
complained of, and (3) redressible by favorable action by the court.224  The Supreme
Court describes these three elements as the “irreducible constitutional minimum”
required for standing to invoke the judicial power under Article III of the
Constitution.225  The Supreme Court has long recognized that this injury need not
necessarily be to a financial or property interest; “aesthetic” and “recreational” injuries
have been found to suffice,226 as well as “informational” injuries.227  An “abstract”
interest in an issue, however, will not suffice.228  Though the injury-in-fact must be
“concrete” and “particularized” to be cognizable,229 the Court has recognized that the
mere fact that an injury is shared by many does not defeat its justiciability.230  And
while the injury must be distinct and “palpable”231 and not “hypothetical,”232 it need not
be large; “an identifiable trifle is enough.”233  If these descriptions of injury-in-fact
sound somewhat self-contradictory, do not be alarmed.  As Justice Douglas observed,
“Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such.”234  Similarly,
Justice Harlan complained that standing doctrine had become “a word game played by
secret rules.”235
In addition to the “irreducible” constitutional minimum of injury-in-fact, causa-
tion, and redressibility, the Court has added “prudential” limits on standing that are
non-constitutional.  These limits include a requirement that the plaintiff assert her own
interests, not those of third parties, a related requirement that the injury complained of
fall within the “zone of interest” protected by the relevant substantive norm the
plaintiff seeks to enforce, and a requirement that the injuries asserted not be so widely
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shared as to amount to “generalized grievances” best subject for remedy by the more
political branches.236  Unlike the irreducible constitutional minima, these prudential
standing limitations may be abrogated by statute.
Organizational plaintiffs—the focus of this Article—must meet additional burdens
to establish standing.  Unless an organizational plaintiff can demonstrate an injury to
a traditional property or business interest, such organizations must normally establish
standing in a representational capacity.237  To do so, an organization must establish that
it has at least one member who has suffered an injury-in-fact sufficient to establish
individual standing for that member.  In addition, the organization must establish that
the matter of litigation is germane to its organizational purposes and that individual
participation of the members affected is not required for complete adjudication.238
As the Court has noted with some understatement, the standing elements “cannot
be defined so as to make application of the constitutional standing requirement a
mechanical exercise.”239  Rather, at least according to Justice O’Connor’s opinion for
the Court in Allen v. Wright,240 standing doctrine is explained through its application
in case law and by reference to the interests served by its basic constitutional
underpinnings: “a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”241
B.  Interests Served by Standing Doctrine
Notwithstanding Justice O’Connor’s dicta in Allen v. Wright, standing doctrine has
been justified and anchored in both more and less than Article III and separation-of-
powers concerns.  Some of the justifications for standing go well beyond Article III
and its Case or Controversy Clause in that they draw on notions of avoiding intrusion
into executive and legislative functions.  Some of the justifications are less than
constitutional in that they draw on more practical considerations of docket control and
litigation efficiency.
Although Article III concepts of justiciability and separation of powers play a
large role in shaping standing doctrine, the Court and legal scholars have also made
reference to sub-constitutional concerns to limit the volume of federal litigation, ensure
vigorous advocacy and specific context for judicial decision-making, avoid collusive
or sham suits, and support the “passive virtues” of Supreme Court deferral of
constitutional review.
1.  Separation of Powers
Article III, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution vests in the judiciary the power
to hear “cases” and “controversies.”  Standing doctrine, like its fellow justiciability
doctrines of ripeness, mootness, and political questions, is an attempt to interpret what
it means to hear a “case” or “controversy” of a judicial nature.  The Court has to some
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extent struggled with this basis as a definition of standing.  As observed by the
textualist-in-chief Justice Scalia, the text in this case is not dispositive:
Art. III, § 1 . . . does not attempt to define those terms.  To be sure, it limits the
jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies,” but an executive inquiry
can bear the name “case” (the Hoffa case) and a legislative dispute can bear the name
“controversy” (the Smoot-Hawley controversy).  Obviously, then, the Constitution’s
central mechanism of separation of powers depends largely upon common
understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to
courts.242
Justice Scalia’s reference to “common understanding” of which activities are appro-
priate to legislatures, executives, and courts may ultimately be no more illuminating,
as it begs the question of whose common understanding is determinative and how that
understanding was reached.
Various members of the Court have sought to refer to historical practice, the
perceived common understanding of the nature of the judicial function, and the
boundaries set by functions vested in the executive or legislative branches to set these
limits.
Justice O’Connor’s dicta in Allen v. Wright points the student of standing doctrine
to Article III of the Constitution to define the doctrine’s boundaries.  However, as
Justice Scalia noted in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the text of Article III is hardly
dispositive.243  The Court has flirted with eighteenth century historical practice, with
shared understandings of the nature of a judicial case, and the proper role of the
judiciary as extra-textual sources of meaning for the Article III “case” or “controversy”
requirement.
Justice Frankfurter twice opined that Article III justiciability, including the identity
of a proper plaintiff, was best determined by reference to the historical practices of the
courts of Westminster.  In his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath,244 he stated:
Limitation on “the judicial Power of the United States” is expressed by the
requirement that a litigant must have “standing to sue” or, more comprehensively, that
a federal court may entertain a controversy only if it is “justiciable.”  Both
characterizations mean that a court will not decide a question unless the nature of the
action challenged, the kind of injury inflicted, and the relationship between the parties
are such that judicial determination is consonant with what was, generally speaking,
the business of the Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the
Constitution was framed.  The jurisdiction of the federal courts can be invoked only
under circumstances which to the expert feel of lawyers constitute a “case or
controversy.”245
Reference to “the business of the Colonial courts and courts of Westminster” has
proven less than satisfactory, however, as an explanation of justiciability doctrine.  As
Chief Justice Warren observed in Flast v. Cohen, the authority of “English judges to
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deliver advisory opinions was well established at the time the Constitution was drafted
. . . .  [a]nd it is quite clear that ‘the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law
of justiciability is that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.’”246  Thorough
research conducted by Professors Winter247 and Sunstein248 established that litigation
by uninjured third-party plaintiffs was quite common both in colonial times and after
the founding.  Criminal prosecutions were routinely carried out not by the executive
branch, but by citizens.  The early Congress enacted qui tam provisions allowing
“informers suits” by uninjured citizens in the name of the United States, also reflecting
Colonial and British practice.  Historical practice certainly does not appear to explain
the nuances of current standing doctrine, much less its doctrinal insistence on injury-in-
fact as the quintessence of a judicial “case” or “controversy.”
Nor should history necessarily be dispositive.  The framers of the Constitution
explicitly rejected the British, colonial system of government by establishing a judicial
branch as a separate and co-equal branch of tripartite government.  Courts in the
British system of government were part of the Executive (Crown) and Legislative
(Parliament) branches; separation of powers under the British system meant only that
the legislature and crown were separate.249  Likewise, colonial practice freely mixed
judicial and legislative functions in colonial legislatures.250  In their experiment with
a new system of government, the framers can hardly be expected to have meant to
import all of the practices of a system they fought a revolution to reject.  However, to
reject historical practice on this ground ought to require some indication that the
particular aspect of the judicial function then in practice was somehow antithetical to
the newly proposed system of government.  Although The Federalist Papers may
reflect a strong urge to reject the nature of the monarchical executive,251 there is much
less indication that the framers meant to fundamentally alter the judicial functions they
were familiar with, other than to ensure the independence of the judiciary from the
other branches of government.252
Nevertheless, to the extent that some “common understanding” of what constitutes
a “case” or “controversy” should inform the boundaries of Article III judicial power,
the contemporary judicial practices surrounding the framers are certainly relevant to
what this common understanding of the minimum of the judicial function should be.
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2.  The “Case or Controversy” Requirement
Justice Frankfurter’s famous dicta referencing the “business of the courts of
Westminster” also suggests that the boundaries of standing may be determined with
reference to “circumstances which to the expert feel of lawyers constitute a ‘case or
controversy.’”253  Justice Scalia echoed this reference in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
invoking a “common understanding of what activities are appropriate  . . . to courts.”254
Under this approach to establishing Article III’s boundaries, the Court appeals to some
fundamental shared notion of what the nature of a “case” is, presumably an
understanding shared by “expert” lawyers based on their training and experience.
Any attempt to define what constitutes a “case,” founders on the same shores as
attempts to derive objective definitions of obscenity for freedom of speech purposes
or to define the “liberty” protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by
reference to “natural law” or “tradition.”255  Ultimately, any attempt to define a “case”
by reference to a “common understanding” of what a case is simply means that a
“case” is defined by reference to the individual judge’s or justice’s own inclination to
hear the case.  The number of five-four split decisions on standing issues in the
Supreme Court itself belies the claim that standing doctrine rests on universal notions
of what constitutes a proper case.256
Moreover, subjective definitions of a “case,” even more so than notions of
“liberty” or “obscenity” tend to become self-fulfilling prophesies.257  Justice Frank-
furter’s explicit reference to the “expert feel of lawyers”258 suggests that a proposed
case that is beyond that “expert” lawyer’s experience will not “feel” like a case.  Yet
every lawyer’s “feel” for a “case” will be a reflection of what “cases” courts have
previously allowed to proceed.  Judicially imposed restrictions on standing thus
become a self-perpetuating meme: once the Supreme Court declares that a particular
kind of plaintiff lacks standing—say lakes and trees, to use Justice Douglas’s
example259—the next generation of lawyers will simply not recognize a lawsuit by a
lake or a tree as a “case,” even while they may recognize a suit by a ship as a “case.”260
Reference to a “common understanding” of what a case is thus becomes a one-way
ratchet to limiting justiciability to an ever smaller category of cases; as the Supreme
Court declares a category of disputes to fall outside the definition of a “case,” such
disputes stop being brought to the courts, and will never again “feel” like a case.
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In searching for a “common” understanding of the limits implicit in the “case or
controversy” formulation, the Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the role of the
courts to determine claims of individual rights asserted by individuals.  As stated by
the Court in Stark v. Wickard,261 this view is frankly hostile to public rights litigation
per se: 
This permits the courts to participate in law enforcement entrusted to administrative
bodies only to the extent necessary to protect justiciable individual rights against
administrative action fairly beyond the granted powers. . . .  This is very far from
assuming that the courts are charged more than administrators or legislators with the
protection of the rights of the people.262
Drawing on this language, Justice Scalia opined in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife that
“‘[i]ndividual rights,’ within the meaning of this passage, do not mean public rights
that have been legislatively pronounced to belong to each individual who forms part
of the public.”263  Under this view, “[t]he Art. III judicial power exists only to redress
or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the court’s
judgment may benefit others collaterally.”264  Proponents of this view point to the
passage in Marbury v. Madison positing that the “province of the court is, solely, to
decide on the rights of individuals.”265  Distancing himself from this view, Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife noted that “[m]odern
litigation has progressed far from the paradigm of Marbury suing Madison to get his
commission or Ogden seeking an injunction to halt Gibbons’s steamboat
operations.”266
Though not stated explicitly in any dicta of the courts, the idea that the judicial
function is limited to protection of minority interests not well represented in the more
democratic branches of government was advanced by then-Judge Scalia in a 1983
article: 
There is, I think, a functional relationship, which can best be described by saying that
the law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of
protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority, and
excludes them from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other
two branches should function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself.
Thus, when an individual who is the very object of a law’s requirement or prohibition
seeks to challenge it, he always has standing.  That is the classic case of the law
bearing down upon the individual himself, and the court will not pause to inquire
whether the grievance is a “generalized” one.267
Judge Scalia draws on the argument that the judicial role is limited to protecting
individual rights from majority action.  According to this approach, where the
individual rights are also majority rights, the more political branches are better suited
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to address them, and the courts should stay their hand lest they intrude on the roles
assigned to the legislative and executive branches.
While this argument has not been articulated by the Supreme Court, Judge Scalia’s
understanding favoring standing for regulatory objects over regulatory beneficiaries
underpins Justice Scalia’s similar conclusion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
[T]he nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary judgment stage)
or proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon
whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue.  If
he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him
injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it . . . .
[W]hen the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he
challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily “substantially more difficult”
to establish.268
This argument for a preference for standing for regulatory “objects” has been
extensively criticized.269  Arguably, the Court has rejected this approach in Friends of
the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,270 which is discussed below.
Although the foregoing interests and boundaries of justiciability reflect the Court’s
and commentators’ not entirely satisfactory attempts to give affirmative meaning to the
Case or Controversy Clause of the Constitution,  the Court has also sought to invoke
negative limits on the scope of the judicial power by reference to powers explicitly
granted to another branch.  From time to time the Court has referred to the Article II
specification that the Executive shall “take Care that the Laws are faithfully
executed”271 as a limit on the scope of standing.  In Allen v. Wright, the Court quoted
the Take Care Clause and reasoned that allowing parents of minority children to
challenge the procedures for allowing tax exemptions to de facto segregated private
schools would improperly involve the judiciary in the generalized enforcement of law:
“We could not recognize respondents’ standing in this case without running afoul of
that structural principle.”272  Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
spelled this argument out in greater detail:
If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-of-powers significance we have
always said, the answer must be obvious: To permit Congress to convert the
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an
“individual right” vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”273
This view of the Take Care Clause as an implicit limit on judicial power has been
criticized by Professor Sunstein, who characterized the Take Care Clause as a “duty,
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not a license.”274  As Professor Sunstein noted, reference to the Take Care Clause as
a limit on Article III justiciability is inconsistent with current standing doctrine; if
enforcement of statutory norms at the behest of citizens violates the structural
provisions in the case of a plaintiff without sufficient individual interest, the violation
of this structure would not disappear simply because the identity of the plaintiff
changed to one who did establish standing.275  Justice Scalia’s view of the Take Care
Clause is also inconsistent with historical practice; prosecution of federal laws in the
early republic was more likely to be commenced by state attorneys general than by the
Federal Executive.276  Justice Scalia’s view also conflicts  with the Court’s acceptance
of non-executive prosecutions in Morrison v. Olson.277
3.   The Rule Against Advisory Opinions
The Court frequently invokes its rule against giving advisory opinions as one of
the underlying bases of standing doctrine.  As stated by Chief Justice Warren in Flast:
When the federal judicial power is invoked to pass upon the validity of actions by the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, the rule against advisory
opinions implements the separation of powers prescribed by the Constitution and
confines federal courts to the role assigned them by Article III.278
The way this justification is invoked is usually tautological: if there is no standing,
there is thus no “case or controversy,” and any opinion given by the court would of
necessity be an “advisory” opinion; therefore, the plaintiff lacks standing.  Thus, it is
no surprise that the reference to advisory opinions appears quite often in dissenting and
concurring opinions where the court has recognized standing.  In such opinions, the
dissent or concurrence usually accuses the majority of issuing an “advisory” opinion.279
If the preclusion against advisory opinions is meant to avoid judicial declarations
concerning hypothetical states of facts,280 then it is not at all clear how the identity of
the plaintiff renders any underlying factual premises either more or less hypothetical.
It may be that the reference to the rule against “advisory opinions” is a form of
shorthand for the individual rights enforcing model discussed above; that is, any
opinion rendered other than in the context of enforcing an individual’s right to specific
relief from harm is being rendered for its advisory purpose rather than its adjudicative
purposes, and is thus improper.  As Judge Scalia stated in his Suffolk Law Review
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article, although the process of adjudication may have the effect of declaring the law
and controlling the acts of the executive, 
The point is not whether the courts do it [assure the regularity of executive action];
but whether the doing of it is alone sufficient justification to invoke their powers;
whether the doing of it is itself “the judicial role,” or merely the incidental effect of
what Marbury v. Madison took to be the judges’ proper business—“solely to decide
the rights of individuals.”281
This “incidental” view of the judiciary’s law-declaring role—indeed, this view of
the Marbury opinion—seems quaint now, and may even have seemed naïve in 1803
when Marbury was decided.282  Moreover, the “incidental” view of the judiciary’s law-
declaring role is at complete odds with the Supreme Court’s own established criteria
for accepting cases for certiorari review, favoring review where the Court’s advice is
needed to settle unsettled questions of law, and eschewing review simply to do justice
for the individual parties.  The Supreme Court rules favor review of a case where “a
state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of
federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.”283  The rules further
state that a “petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of
law.”284
If the so-called rule against advisory opinions requires a live controversy between
litigants with a personal stake in the outcome that can be redressed by the Court’s
decision, then mootness doctrine stands as a glaring exception to this rule.  The
Supreme Court has described mootness doctrine as “‘the doctrine of standing set in a
time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the
litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).’”285  Yet, the
Court routinely hears cases that have become moot under the rubric of cases “capable
of repetition yet evading review.”286  The Court justifies this exception on the grounds
that, otherwise, certain categories of controversies could repeat themselves without the
judiciary ever being able to declare the applicable legal rule.  The justification for this
exception is a frank acknowledgement that, at least in some kinds of controversies, the
law-declaring role of the judiciary for future controversies trumps whatever Article III
concerns require a live case in the current controversy.  The Supreme Court itself has
acknowledged that “the strict, formalistic view of Art. III jurisprudence, while perhaps
the starting point of all inquiry, is riddled with exceptions” that serve competing
“practicalities and prudential considerations.”287  Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed the
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The earliest standing cases, including Frothingham, arose in the context of
constitutional challenges to the validity of Congressional legislation.  Asserting a
reluctance to be drawn into the role of reviewing the wisdom of legislation, the
Supreme Court has made reference to the fact that the role of such a “Council of
Revision” was rejected by the framers of the Constitution.289  Like the rule against
advisory opinions, this reasoning assumes that any opinion rendered outside the
context of an individual asserting individual injury would constitute a naked assertion
of judicial power of revision, inconsistent with the legislative powers granted
exclusively to Congress by Article I of the Constitution.  By its terms, this aspect of
justiciability would seem to apply only to cases challenging the validity of legislation.
4.  The Need to Ensure Concreteness and Adversity
While the foregoing justifications for standing and justiciability doctrine constitute
an attempt to give meaning to the positive boundaries of the grant of the judicial
power, and the negative boundaries established by the grant of the legislative and
executive powers to other branches of government, other justifications are less overtly
bound to the constitutional text and structure, and more bound to the practical
administration of the adjudicative function.  Among these more pragmatic
considerations is the argument that a party with a genuine injury and a specific factual
context for their claim will improve that adjudicatory process by providing
“concreteness” and “adversity.”  According to the Court in Baker v. Carr, this concrete
adverseness is the “gist” of the standing inquiry.290  The Baker Court explained that
“the gist of the question of standing” is whether the party seeking relief has “alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”291
This “concrete adverseness” interest has two components: (1) to improve judicial
decisionmaking by providing a specific factual context for the development of legal
rules; and (2) to ensure sufficiently vigorous advocacy on the part of the litigants to
provide the court with the best arguments on both sides of an issue.  Both of these
premises have been subject to some criticism.292  As for vigorous advocacy, the Court
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has recognized that organizational plaintiffs, in general, excel at providing vigorous
advocacy.293  In his Suffolk Law Review article then-Judge Scalia opined that “if the
purpose of standing is ‘to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues,’ the doctrine is remarkably ill designed for its end.”294  He
noted, “Often the best adversaries are national organizations such as the NAACP or the
American Civil Liberties Union that have a keen interest in the abstract question at
issue in the case, but no ‘concrete injury-in-fact’ whatever.”295  Of course, as “an
identifiable trifle” of an injury will suffice to establish standing, standing doctrine per
se does nothing to ensure that an individual plaintiff’s injury is of sufficient magnitude
to ensure adequate commitment to the expense of the litigation process.
5.  Avoiding “Sham Suits” and Minding the Floodgates 
Another functional justification for standing requirements is implicit, though rarely
stated.  By requiring a plaintiff to establish a genuine injury to herself in order to
invoke the judicial forum, standing doctrine helps to weed out the sham plaintiff.  The
Court’s opinion in Flast v. Cohen suggests that the avoidance of friendly or collusive
suits is “closely related to” standing doctrine,296 though this relation is not otherwise
mentioned by the cases.
As with ensuring adverseness, the relatively low threshold for the magnitude of the
requisite injury somewhat reduces standing’s effectiveness to avoid collusive suits.
However, of all the interests protected by standing doctrine, this one, at least, goes
directly to the identity of the plaintiff.
Early standing cases warned of floods of federal court litigation if certain kinds
of public rights litigation were allowed to proceed.  Thus, in Frothingham, the Court
warned:
The administration of any statute, likely to produce additional taxation to be imposed
upon a vast number of taxpayers, the extent of whose several liability is indefinite and
constantly changing, is essentially a matter of public and not of individual concern.
If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer
may do not same, not only in respect of the statute here under review but also in
respect of every other appropriation act and statute whose administration requires the
outlay of public money, and whose validity may be questioned.  The bare suggestion
of such a result, with its attendant inconveniences, goes far to sustain the conclusion
which we have reached, that a suit of this character cannot be maintained.297
While the Court has not repeated this extra-constitutional rationale for limited standing,
one cannot help get the sense that docket control in the broad sense of the term is part
of the judicial reluctance to give broad access to federal courts.298
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6.  Passive Virtues
Standing doctrine has roots in docket micro-management as well.  Alexander
Bickel, in his magnum opus The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Politics, identified standing doctrine as one of the malleable doctrines used by
the Supreme Court sub silentio to avoid confrontation with the coordinate
governmental branches and to defer judicial resolution of specific constitutional
issues.299  Professor Bickel thus identifies “standing” among the “passive virtues” used
by the Supreme Court to manage the timing of its consideration of constitutional
questions as part of its ongoing dialogue with the more political branches.
Identification of standing doctrine with the “passive virtues” of the Supreme Court
is more a legal reality of standing doctrine (and some of its inconsistencies) than it is
a justification for the doctrine or a key to its application.  For obvious reasons, no
justice has openly espoused Bickelian passive virtues as a source of standing doctrine,
though this view certainly has echoes in some of the standing opinions.  For example,
Justice Powell, concurring in United States v. Richardson,300 expounded that
repeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and
the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to
either.  The public confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the
latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power
to negative the actions of the other branches.301
This “passive virtues” view of the judiciary’s role may underlie the Court’s
repeated reference to the judicial power as a remedy of last resort, and then only to be
invoked by a “proper plaintiff” with an injury to be redressed.302  It also underlies
Judge Scalia’s reasoning in his Standing as an Element of Separation of Powers
article: though Judge Scalia does not cite Bickel, he describes a passive role of the
judiciary, addressing only those cases that come its way with a proper plaintiff
asserting rights not addressable by the other branches.303
Perhaps Justice Douglas, concurring in Flast, gave the most frank acknowledge-
ment that standing doctrine was born of a desire to avoid specific constitutional issues
and had long since outlived this function:
Frothingham, decided in 1923, was in the heyday of substantive due process, when
courts were sitting in judgment on the wisdom or reasonableness of legislation.  The
claim in Frothingham was that a federal regulatory Act dealing with maternity
deprived the plaintiff of property without due process of law.  When the Court used
substantive due process to determine the wisdom or reasonableness of legislation, it
was indeed transforming itself into the Council of Revision which was rejected by the
Constitutional Convention.  It was that judicial attitude, not the theory of standing to
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sue rejected in Frothingham, that involved “important hazards for the continued
effectiveness of the federal judiciary,” to borrow a phrase from my Brother Harlan.
A contrary result in Frothingham in that setting might well have accentuated an
ominous trend to judicial supremacy.304
Whatever its validity may be as a means of managing the political legitimacy of
the Supreme Court, as the Court addresses questions of constitutional magnitude, the
“passive virtues” of discretionary constitutional adjudication in the Supreme Court do
nothing to explain or justify a doctrine that has been used to shut the doors of all levels
of the judiciary to organizational plaintiffs seeking to assure implementation of
regulatory norms adopted by the legislative branch.
C.  The Mixed Success of Ideological Plaintiffs in Establishing Standing
1.  The Idea of Constitutionally Limited Government
Many of the Supreme Court’s standing cases have involved citizens seeking to
enforce their vision of constitutional government.  These citizen plaintiffs may be
among the mostly purely ideologically motivated, as their efforts seek primarily to
ensure that government follows their vision of the ideals established in the
Constitution.  Sometimes these plaintiffs are motivated by economic concerns, as when
the challenged government action competes with their private economic activities.
Often, however, these plaintiffs can’t point to any tangible benefit—in terms of
individual property or “status” interests to be achieved in the litigation—other than
their firmly held belief that they would be happier living in a society in which the
government followed the Constitutional norm in question (or that they are deeply
offended when the government does not).  The first “standing” cases (although not
phrased as such) involved citizens challenging governmental action that the plaintiffs
strongly believed was unauthorized.  As noted, in Frothingham v. Mellon, the Supreme
Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the Maternity Act.305  Mrs.
Frothingham asserted no injury to herself other than the admittedly miniscule increase
in her federal tax bill necessary to support federal expenditures under the Act—an
amount too completely overwhelmed by the costs of litigation to justify the case as a
rational response to an economic injury.306  Rather, Mrs. Frothingham’s only reason to
bring the litigation was to protest and put an end to what she believed to be an
unconstitutional meddling of the United States Congress in matters not explicitly
authorized by Article I of the Constitution.307  With the rejection of her “taxpayer”
interest as insufficient to support adjudication of her challenge, Mrs. Frothingham
assured her place in generations of Constitutional Law and Civil Procedure casebooks
as the grandmother of all disappointed ideological plaintiffs.
But Frothingham did not prove to be the absolute end to all ideological plaintiffs
pinning their litigation hopes on taxpayer, or similarly dilute, status.  In a series of
428 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2
308. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
309. Baker, 369 U.S. at 206-08.
310. 302 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1938).
311. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 318 (1936).
312. Id.
313. 392 U.S. at 106. 
314. Id. at 103-06.
315. Id. at 102-03.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 105.
318. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 483-84.
319. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
320. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479-80.
cases beginning before, and continuing after, Frothingham, the Court recognized the
right of individual voters to raise constitutional claims concerning vote dilution.308
This series of cases culminated in its decision in Baker v. Carr, which specifically
affirmed the standing of Tennessee voters to assert an Equal Protection Clause
challenge to disproportional state legislative districts.309   
The Court engaged in a similar reversal of course when considering constitutional
challenges to the electricity market participation of the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA).  In 1938, it rejected the justiciability of such a challenge, when brought by a
competitor, in Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes.310  Yet it considered (and rejected on the
merits) a similar challenge when brought by a shareholder of the same Alabama Power
Company in a shareholders’ derivative action.311  If anything, the plaintiff in the latter
case seems to have been more ideologically (and less economically) motivated than the
former; Mr. Ashwander styled his shareholders’ derivative action as one seeking to
protect the company from losses from power purchase contracts entered into with the
TVA, but it is altogether unclear just how the utility would suffer by purchasing the
power.312
Not even the bar against federal taxpayer suits proved ironclad.  Half a century
after Frothingham, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the bar against
taxpayer standing in Flast,313 where it permitted suit by a taxpayer who asserted a First
Amendment Establishment Clause challenge to direct federal aid to parochial
schools.314  The majority in Flast posited an alchemy that converted the lead weight of
taxpayer status into gold: the so-called “double nexus” test.315  Under this formula, an
ideological plaintiff must establish both a connection between the status alleged as the
basis for standing and the Congressional power exercised (such as a taxpayer
challenging an exercise of the taxing and spending power) and a connection between
the Constitutional limitation asserted and the Congressional power so invoked.316  In
Flast, the Court found that the Establishment Clause was a specific limit on the Taxing
and Spending Clause, supporting standing.317  But later Establishment Clause plaintiffs
were to be less-than-successful in asserting taxpayer standing.  In Valley Forge, the
Court rejected a taxpayer lawsuit challenging the donation of surplus government
property to a religious school, and in doing so, the Court again rejected any implicit
right of every citizen to constitutional government.318   The Court also rejected
taxpayer standing in that case; finding insufficient nexus between taxpayer status and
the Property Disposition Clause,319 as opposed to the Taxing and Spending Clause.320
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Other attempts to invoke the double-nexus test to assert constitutional claims have
likewise been unsuccessful in the Supreme Court, even where the plaintiff relied on
constitutional limitations on Congressional government action at least as explicit as the
Establishment Clause.321
At the end of the day, it is hard to reconcile the constitutional government cases
from Frothingham to Flast.  If Frothingham stood for the principle that a federal
taxpayer’s interest in her tax bill was just too miniscule to be an injury that creates a
genuine controversy, then Flast would seem to have reversed that part of Frothingham.
But Valley Forge and other cases, in turn, reject that reading of Flast.322  The Court in
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Valley Forge rejected an attempt to read Flast,
alternatively, as implying some greater constitutionally recognizable (and litigable)
interest for claims based on specific constitutional prohibitions.  Nevertheless, the
voting apportionment cases imply that the Court recognizes at least some abstract
constitutional interests (e.g., the weight given to an individual vote) as sufficiently
concrete to support standing, whereas others are not (e.g., the right to a government
that does not provide economic support to religious institutions).  Ultimately, it may
be easier to explain the Court’s shifting recognition of standing to raise ideologically-
based constitutional challenges based on changes in the identities of the justices than
by taking the doctrinal statements at face value.
2.  A Pristine Environment
Environmental cases have been responsible for much of the recent contours of
Article III standing.  Like the constitutional-government plaintiffs, environmental
plaintiffs are often motivated by pure ideas—the idea of a pristine, unpolluted
environment, the idea that wilderness still exists in some places on the planet, or the
idea that polar bears or tigers or elephants still roam in the wild somewhere.  Many
such plaintiffs assert tangible, although untraditional, personal interests as well.
Obviously, an individual who can no longer swim or fish in a river because of water
pollution has suffered a loss of freedom of action, not merely the loss of the idea of
clean water.  Similarly, an individual whose forest hiking trail has been clearcut or
mined has suffered more than a pure ideological loss.  Yet the vast majority of the
litigation brought to redress these individual interests has nevertheless been brought
by organizational plaintiffs whose organizational purposes are more ideological than
individualistic. 
The Supreme Court’s first environmental standing case was a nominal loss for the
environmental plaintiffs but a long-term win for the recognition of environmental
values as supporting standing.  In Sierra Club v. Morton,323 the Sierra Club sued the
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United States Forest Service to prevent its approval of an extensive ski development
in the Mineral King Valley in the Sequoia National Forest.324  The Sierra Club asserted
only its own organizational interest in preserving the environment of the Sierra Nevada
Mountains, and not the interest of any of its individual members who used the
resources of the Mineral King area.325  The Court specifically acknowledged that
environmental values such as recreational or aesthetic interests could constitute
sufficient injury-in-fact to support standing.326  This represented a significant broaden-
ing of the law of standing, moving far beyond the traditional notion of the
“Hohfeldian” plaintiffs.327  At the same time, however, the Court specifically rejected
the Sierra Club’s capacity to sue to enforce these values in its own right; rather, it
could only seek to enforce the interest of specific members.328  As noted earlier, this
decision established the paradigm for ideological representational standing that persists
to this date.
The Supreme Court’s environmental injury-in-fact doctrine has since vacillated
between extremes of requiring specific tangible injury to specific identified activities
by the plaintiff, at one extreme, and of accepting almost purely ideological harms to
environmental well-being, at the other.  As an example of the former, in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, the Court rejected Defenders of Wildlife’s standing to challenge
an EPA regulation that exempted U.S.-funded projects abroad from the consultation
requirements of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.329  Although Defenders of
Wildlife (DOW) identified members who had previously visited the habitats of specific
animal species endangered by international development projects, as well as members
with professional interests in the study of the same endangered animals, it identified
no members who habitually visited the endangered habitats or who had specific plans
to return.330  The Supreme Court rejected DOW’s standing under these circumstances,
characterizing as “speculation and fantasy” any claim that persons specifically
interested in a particular species would be injured by the loss of individual members
of that species in other parts of the world.331  DOW and its members are classically-
pure ideological plaintiffs; they felt deeply and strongly about an idea—the preserva-
tion of the endangered Asian Elephant and Nile Crocodile—but had trouble identifying
how the disappearance of those species in the wild would affect their lives in any
tangible way other than their own deeply felt loss.
Eight years later, the Court accepted exactly such an ideological interest in an
undisturbed environment as a sufficient injury-in-fact to establish standing.  It
effectively recognized that the loss of the idea of a clean environment could itself
support standing in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,
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Inc.332  In Friends of the Earth, citizen plaintiffs commenced an enforcement action
under the Citizen Suit provision of the Clean Water Act,333 alleging that the defendant’s
hazardous waste disposal facility had exceeded its permit limits for mercury
discharges.334  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
on liability, and after a trial to determine the amount of penalties, the District Court
determined that the mercury discharges, although in violation of permit limits, had not
caused any perceptible impact on the environment.335  On appeal to the Supreme Court,
the Court first upheld plaintiffs’ standing on the basis of affidavits submitted by the
plaintiffs establishing that some of them resided near the Tyger River, had previously
used the river recreationally, and that they currently refrained from using the Tyger
River because the river “looked and smelled polluted.”336  Despite the undisturbed
factual finding that the discharges in question had no perceivable impact on the
environment, a majority of the Court held that injury-in-fact meant “not injury to the
environment but injury to the plaintiff.”337  
Just as Flast, Frothingham, and Valley Forge are irreconcilable on doctrinal
grounds, Friends of the Earth and Defenders of Wildlife seem contradictory by their
terms.  In Friends of the Earth, the Court recognized that environmental injury can
consist of an injury that is completely internal to the spiritual well-being of the plaintiff
—a purely ideological injury.  In Defenders of Wildlife, the Court rejected even a
deeply felt spiritual connection to a distant endangered species as the basis for injury-
in-fact.  On their facts, these two cases can be reconciled on the basis of simple
physical proximity—the individual plaintiffs in Friends of the Earth resided near to the
affected river, while the plaintiffs in Defenders of Wildlife were quite far from the
natural habitats of the species they cared about.338  However, this distinction does not
change the nature of the injury recognized in Friends of the Earth—an injury to the
plaintiffs’ feeling of well being, without any provable physical manifestation.  This was
not the first time that the Court recognized environmental well-being as the basis for
standing.  In Carolina Environmental Study Group v. Duke Power,339 the Court found
sufficient injury on the part of neighbors to a proposed nuclear power plant to allow
a constitutional challenge to the Price-Anderson Act’s340 limitation of nuclear power
plant liability.341  In doing so, the Court grounded its holding in part on the inchoate
and unprovable effects of nuclear radiation: “The emission of non-natural radiation
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into appellees’ environment would also seem a direct and present injury, given our
generalized concern about exposure to radiation and the apprehension flowing from
the uncertainty about the health and genetic consequences of even small emissions like
those concededly emitted by nuclear power plants.”342
3.  Equal Access to Housing, Education, and Benefits
Cases involving equal access to housing, education, medical care, and other
government benefits form another category of standing cases.  Individual plaintiffs may
be hoping for individual redress that would improve their options for these resources,
but as with the environmental cases, these cases are often commenced and supported
by associations organized around the idea of improving the equality of access.  As in
the category of environmental interests, plaintiffs asserting the idea of equal access
have had mixed success, often failing to clear the hurdles of causation or redressibility.
a.  Housing Inequality Cases
The discriminatory zoning cases exemplify the mixed success of equality-oriented
plaintiffs.  In the 1975 case, Warth v. Seldin,343 the Court denied standing to plaintiffs
who challenged allegedly discriminatory zoning practices in Penfield, New York,
which had the result of denying the availability of low-income housing.344  The would-
be low-income residents and affordable housing developer plaintiffs failed to meet the
causation element of standing, as they could not point to a specific project that would
be built if the zoning requirements were relaxed.345  Rochester taxpayers, who paid
more taxes to shoulder the increased burden of providing affordable housing region-
ally, were held ineligible to assert the constitutional interests of the would-be
residents.346 
Two years later, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Council,347 the Court reached the merits of the discriminatory zoning
claim in a case where the plaintiffs included an affordable housing developer whose
specific project had been denied a permit, as well as would be residents of that specific
development.348  The Arlington Heights plaintiffs thus surmounted the causation hurdle
that foiled the plaintiffs in Warth.  Justice Brennan’s discussion of the organizational
interest in developing affordable housing seems to recognize that a not-for-profit
organization could have a legitimate, judicially cognizable interest in its ideological
organizational goals:
It has long been clear that economic injury is not the only kind of injury that can
support a plaintiff's standing.  MHDC is a nonprofit corporation.  Its interest in
building Lincoln Green stems not from a desire for economic gain, but rather from an
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interest in making suitable low-cost housing available in areas where such housing
is scarce.  This is not mere abstract concern about a problem of general interest.  The
specific project MHDC intends to build, whether or not it will generate profits,
provides that “essential dimension of specificity” that informs judicial decisionm-
aking.349
Thus, the Court seemed to suggest that an organizational interest in an idea—here, the
idea of affordable housing opportunities—might suffice to establish injury-in-fact for
standing.
The Supreme Court would later recognize an even more frankly ideological injury
as sufficient for standing to challenge housing discrimination in two cases, Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.350 and Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood.351
In both of these cases the Court recognized the plaintiffs’ interest in residing in an
integrated community, and the “social and professional advantages” flowing therefrom
to allow existing residents to challenge racial discrimination in housing.352  Similarly,
in Havens Realty v. Coleman,353 the Court allowed a suit under the Fair Housing Act354
to proceed on behalf of “checkers” who posed as apartment seekers and were subject
to racial steering by real estate agents.355  The Court avoided the objection to assertion
of third-party rights (controlling in Warth) by redefining the injury as an injury to a
congressionally-granted informational interest in accurate information about housing,
one that could be asserted both by the checkers and by the fair housing organization
they worked for.356
b.  Equal Access to Health Care and Education
As with the housing plaintiffs, ideological plaintiffs seeking equal access to
education and health care opportunities have had mixed success in establishing their
standing.  Like the housing plaintiffs who could not point to a specific housing project
in Warth, plaintiffs seeking to challenge government policies that tended to encourage
the denial of equal educational or health care opportunities have been precluded by the
causation element of standing.
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization (EKWRO),357 the
Court rejected the standing of indigent individuals and an organization representing
their interests to challenge the Internal Revenue Service’s change in policy allowing
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charitable status to hospitals that did not provide services to indigent patients.358  The
Court held that the redressibility of the plaintiffs’ injuries depended on the actions of
independent actors not before the Court (the hospitals in question), who might well
choose to forego charitable tax status rather than provide free services to the
indigent.359  Similarly, in Allen v. Wright,360 the Court rejected the standing of minority
parents of public school children in desegregating school districts to challenge the IRS
regulations that had the effect of allowing charitable tax status to competing private
schools organized specifically to siphon white students from the desegregating school
districts.361  As in EKWRO, the Court reasoned that the private schools might choose
to forego tax status rather than admit minority students on an equal basis, so that
“redressibility” was lacking.362
Contrast these two cases with Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group Inc.,363 where the Court accepted the standing of an environmental organization
to challenge the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act, limiting the liability of the
nuclear power industry for nuclear accidents.364  The Court accepted the plaintiffs’
claims of environmental harms that would flow from a specific nuclear power plant as
sufficient for standing purposes, and did not, à la EKWRO and Allen, dismiss the
causation of these claims on the grounds that the power company might choose to build
the same plant even without the incentives of the Price-Anderson Act.365
The result in Duke Power might be explained as a “standing to lose” case.366
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, argued as much by pointing out that, in
his view, the Court had ignored the standing rules established in EKWRO and Allen in
order to give an “advisory opinion” upholding the Price-Anderson Act so as to provide
necessary assurances to the nuclear power industry.367  Had the Court denied standing
and vacated the decision below, the industry would be left with a decision declaring
Price-Anderson invalid, vacated on other grounds.  If avoiding this outcome was the
Duke Power majority’s motivation, then the Court felt (implicitly) that the importance
of upholding the constitutional validity of the Price-Anderson Act was a factor
outweighing the restraints imposed by standing doctrine as expressed in EKWRO and
Allen.  Thus, the “standing to lose” explanation suggests that standing doctrine and the
“rule” against advisory opinions is subject to exceptions based on counterbalancing
concerns.368
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In Allen, the plaintiffs also asserted, without success, that the persistence of de-
facto segregated tax-exempt private schools imposed a stigma injury on them.369  The
Court summarily rejected this ground for standing.370  Compare this rejection of stigma
injury to the Court’s acceptance, during the same term, of a challenge to gender-
differential requirements for spousal retirement benefits from the Postal Service in
Heckler v. Mathews.371  In Heckler, the Court accepted the purely ideological injury
it characterized as “the right to receive ‘benefits . . . distributed according to
classifications which do not without sufficient justification differentiate among covered
[applicants] solely on the basis of sex,’”372 even though the plaintiff’s success in the
case would result in no additional pension payments to him,373 and even though the
“stigma” complained of by Mathews could not fairly be characterized as a stigma
suffered by him.374  This contrast illustrates that, at least in some cases, a plaintiff’s
ideological vision of the good society (i.e., one without gender discrimination) suffices
to establish standing.
The Court has similarly characterized the plaintiff’s interest in challenging affir-
mative action in school admissions as an interest in “competing on a level playing
field” to avoid the obvious redressibility problems of the plaintiff applicant who might
fail to gain admission even in the absence of racial preferences for minorities.375  This
interest in a “level playing field,” decoupled from actual admission to the educational
program, is every bit an ideological interest in a vision of good society as an interest
in a world where African elephants still roam, or where religious schools do not receive
free real property from the government.
4.  Freedom From Risk of Future Harm
This last category of cases I will discuss brings us back to the central topic of this
Article: the standing of people interested in minimizing future risk of harm to
themselves, who often form the core constituency for enforcement of regulatory
statutes.  These plaintiffs may seek peace of mind, but like other ideological plaintiffs,
they cannot necessarily point to a specific activity, right, or privilege of which they
have been deprived.
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The Supreme Court has not been particularly accommodating to such plaintiffs
seeking to avoid future risk.  In the leading case of Los Angeles v. Lyons,376 the Court
vacated an injunction against continued use of chokeholds by the Los Angeles Police
Department.377  The suit had been prosecuted successfully in the lower courts by a man
who had been subjected to a police chokehold, rendering him unconscious, during a
traffic stop.378  The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to obtain an
injunction against future use of chokeholds during arrests, reasoning that it was
extremely unlikely that the same plaintiff would again be arrested, resist arrest, and be
subject to a chokehold.379  According to the Court, Lyons would have to show that the
Los Angeles Police, as official policy, always used chokeholds in all encounters with
citizens, or that Lyons planned to break the law in the future and resist arrest.380  The
Court specifically rejected Lyons’s claim that his reasonable fear of being subjected
to a chokehold again in the future was sufficient injury-in-fact to support standing: “It
is the reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not
the plaintiff's subjective apprehensions.”381  The Court has just recently relied on Lyons
to reject a claim of standing based on probabilistic future procedural harms in Summers
v. Earth Island Institute.382
The Court’s dismissal of probabilistic and well-being harms in Summers and
Lyons contrasts sharply with its holding in Friends of the Earth Inc., that it is “not
injury to the environment, but injury to the plaintiff” that counts for injury-in-fact,
implicitly acknowledging that a plaintiff’s reasonable fears of environmental
contamination suffice for standing purposes even in the absence of objectively
demonstrable harm to the environment.383  Lyons contrasts even more sharply with the
Court’s explicit acceptance of apprehension for one’s health as a sufficient injury-in-
fact in Duke Power: “The emission of non-natural radiation into appellees’
environment would also seem a direct and present injury, given our generalized
concern about exposure to radiation and the apprehension flowing from the uncertainty
about the health and genetic consequences of even small emissions like those con-
cededly emitted by nuclear power plants.”384  The stark contrast between the Court’s
willingness to accept subjective injury to well-being as sufficient in environmental
cases and insufficient in law enforcement cases has led more than one commentator to
suggest that the Court’s standing jurisprudence is influenced by the upper-class values
of its personnel.385
In summary, the Supreme Court’s rhetoric is hostile to ideological plaintiffs
seeking vindication of ideological visions of better government or better protection of
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their interests in a particular ordering of civil society or environmental or cultural
norms.  Despite this rhetoric, the Court has from time to time allowed purely
ideological claims to proceed, simply by recasting the claimed injury in ideological
terms it was willing to accept.  Thus, Lyon’s fear of being once again subject to an
unjustified chokehold was remote and speculative, while the environmentalist plaintiffs
in Duke Power had a “direct and present” injury due to an “apprehension flowing from
the uncertainty about health and genetic consequences” of radiation.386   Recreational
users of the Tyger River in Friends of the Earth were allowed to assert damage to their
sense of environmental well-being without showing perceptible harm to the
environment.387  Mr. Mathews was allowed to assert an ideological interest in gender
neutral rules for distribution of pension benefits even if he stood to gain not a penny
more in benefits.388  Mr. Bakke could assert an interest in race neutral admissions
procedures even if he still would not get into medical school,389 and Mr. Trafficante
could assert an interest in the social benefits of living in an integrated community.390
These plaintiffs were heard even while challenges to tax policies encouraging
segregated schools391 and refusal of medical services to indigents392 were not heard
because the harms alleged were too speculative or unredressible.
The Supreme Court justifies standing doctrine by emphatically denying that “the
federal courts [are] . . . publicly funded forums for the ventilation of public
grievances.”393  But what if, after the adoption of Article III of the Constitution from
which the standing limits are said to derive, the Constitution had been amended to
guarantee a right of the people to assemble into groups and petition the judiciary for
redress of their shared grievances?  Would that amendment affect the analysis of the
standing of public interest groups who had associated specifically for the purpose of
asserting their shared grievances before the courts?
VI.  THE PETITION CLAUSE AND ITS RELATION TO THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, inter alia, that
“Congress shall make no law  . . . abridging  . . . the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”394  As a matter
of text, drafting history, and interpretation, this right of petition includes the right to
petition the judiciary for a redress of grievances as well as the other branches of
government.  Also as a matter of text, drafting history, history of practice, and
interpretation, the right to petition so guaranteed is linked, though not necessarily
limited, to the right of assembly; the Petition Clause specifically addresses group action
to seek redress of shared grievances.  Although the Petition Clause has enjoyed
renewed attention by academic commentators in the last decade, commentators
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disagree about the extent the Petition Clause can be read to modify the scope of
justiciability and jurisdictional doctrines.395  Advocates of a “strong” Petition
Clause—most prominently Professor Pfander—have argued, for instance, that the
Petition Clause guarantee defeats the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity.396
Advocates of a “weak” Petition Clause, on the other hand, suggest that the Petition
Clause adds barely anything to the protections afforded by due process and a limited
protection against punishment for seeking judicial redress.397  However, if the right to
petition is anything more than surplusage, duplicative of the Fifth Amendment right to
due process and the free speech guarantees elsewhere in the First Amendment, it must
establish an interest in having shared grievances heard by each of the three branches
of government on neutral terms.  
A.   The Right to Petition Includes the Right to Petition the 
Judiciary for Redress of Grievances
The Supreme Court has relatively recently recognized and affirmed that the right
to petition includes a right to petition the federal courts for redress.  The Court’s first
mention of the right to petition in the context of access to courts and the litigation
process was somewhat oblique, and like the Court’s later petition analysis, came in the
mixed context of First Amendment expressive rights.  In NAACP v. Button,398 the Court
struck down an Alabama statute that criminalized, as a form of improper solicitation,
the NAACP’s practice of recruiting potential clients as part of its program of providing
free representation to victims of racial discrimination.399  The Court’s rationale
recognized the importance of associational interests, litigation as an expressive activity,
and, incidentally, as a petitioning activity:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private
differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment
by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community
in this country.  It is thus a form of political expression.  Groups which find
themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the
courts.  Just as it was true of the opponents of New Deal legislation during the 1930’s,
for example, no less is it true of the Negro minority today.  And under the conditions
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of modern government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a
minority to petition for redress of grievances.400
The Button case arose in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education,401 from
Virginia’s efforts to quash the NAACP’s substantial litigation efforts to implement the
school desegregation requirements.402  Significantly, Justice Harlan’s dissent in Button
relied on the fact that the anti-solicitation rules did not on their face discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint—pro-segregation groups were equally precluded from soliciting
clients as anti-segregation groups.403
The Button opinion is less than explicit in holding that the First Amendment right
to petition includes a right of access to courts.  However, one year later in Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,404 the Court made this connection more explicit in
striking down a state regulation that prohibited a union from providing group legal
services to its members.405  The Court held, “The State can no more keep these workers
from using their cooperative plan to advise one another than it could use more direct
means to bar them from resorting to the courts to vindicate their legal rights. The right
to petition the courts cannot be so handicapped.”406  Thus the Court recognized that the
First Amendment right to petition is a right to “petition the courts.”407  The Court
subsequently reaffirmed that holding in later cases involving union legal service plans
that states sought to restrict under attorney regulation rules.  In United Transportation
Union v. State Bar of Michigan,408 the Court stated that “collective activity undertaken
to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection
of the First Amendment.”409  Additionally, in United Mine Workers of America,
District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n,410  the Court similarly asserted that “the freedom
of speech, assembly and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
gives [the union] the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its members in
the assertion of their legal rights.”411
The Supreme Court also applied the right to petition to include the right to petition
courts in developing the petition exceptions to the Sherman Antitrust Act412 and the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).413  In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference
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v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,414 the Court first recognized that joint lobbying efforts,
although literally within the antitrust prohibition against any combination agreement
in restraint of trade, could not be punished under the Sherman Act because such
petitioning activities were subject to First Amendment protection.415  According to the
Court, the “right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and
we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.”416
The Court explicitly extended this antitrust immunity to petitions directed at the
judicial system as well in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,417
where the Court held that “[c]ertainly the right to petition extends to all departments
of the Government.  The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the
right of petition.”418
Some courts and commentators read the Court’s Noerr and California Motor
Transport holdings as based on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional
grounds.419  However, the Supreme Court made clear the constitutional underpinnings
of this statutory construction by applying a similar exception to the NLRA in Bill
Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB.420  In Bill Johnson’s, the Court held that the
NLRB could not enjoin an employer’s defamation and harassment suit against
picketing employees as an unfair labor practice.421  Though interpreting the NLRA, the
Court couched its holding explicitly in terms of a First Amendment right of access to
courts: “Considering the First Amendment right of access to the courts . . . we conclude
that the Board's interpretation of the Act is untenable.”422  Although the Court has not
suggested that this right is absolute, Bill Johnson’s and subsequent cases discuss the
circumstances where baseless, malicious, or sham litigation may be punished.423
B.  The Right to Petition Is Both Individual and Collective,  
But Is Strongest in the Context of Collective Political Action
Textually, the Petition Clause combines the rights to assembly and petition.  There
remains some debate about the extent that the right to petition is properly paired with
the right to assembly—and is thus a group right—as well as the extent to which the
right to petition extends to “non-political” individual redress and political concerns.
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In my perspective, the right to petition extends to individuals as well as groups and to
individual concerns as well as to political issues of general concern; however, as is the
case in First Amendment expressive rights, the weight accorded to the petition interest
may vary depending on whether it is a group petition and whether the petition goes to
“political” issues of self-governance.
Literally read, the Petition Clause combines the rights of assembly and petition
into one right of the people.  The First Amendment provides, in full: “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”424
Parsing the text, the Petition Clause guarantees “the right” (singular) “peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.”425  In addition,
the use of a comma to separate the word “assemble” from the phrase “to petition,” as
opposed to the semicolons used between the Religion and Speech Clauses, likewise
suggests a connection between the rights of assembly and petition.  The practical
history of petitioning activities provides some support to this connection between the
rights of assembly and petition:  in a pre-Internet and direct-mail age, the only practical
way for citizens of like views to combine and produce a petition was to assemble in
one place for that purpose.  Indeed, in the debates over the First Amendment, the
framers specifically linked the right to assemble and “consult for the common good”
as a necessary predicate to the right to formulate and present petitions for redress.
During the debates on the First Amendment, there was a motion to strike the
reference to the right of assembly, and although this motion was defeated, there was
no suggestion that the rights to assembly and petition were inextricably linked.  An
individual right to petition also draws support from the petition practice at the time of
the founding: though many petitions were group petitions that were political in nature,
many more petitions were individual petitions for individual relief (often in the nature
of judicial relief).426
The dependence of the petition right on political concerns evokes a similar
tension.  The Court decided Button in the context of a highly political campaign by the
NAACP to implement school desegregation.427  This led some courts to hold that the
right to petition the judiciary there recognized was limited to public or political
concerns, or that the right to petition drew life only when combined with some other
First Amendment interest such as the right to assembly.428  These decisions are in
tension with the Supreme Court’s recognition of the petition right in Bill Johnson’s,
well outside the context of group activity or political concerns.
One need not resolve these tensions for the purposes of this Article.  As discussed
in more detail below, First Amendment doctrine has moved beyond Justice Black’s
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bright-line tests of absolute protection or absolute un-protection;429 rather, the Court
and most commentators recognize that First Amendment interests invoke balancing
tests and heightened scrutiny according to the perceived value of the expressive
conduct involved.  Political speech continues to be recognized as the First
Amendment’s core value, deserving of the highest protection.  It would follow that
petitions for judicial redress that involve political and public issues of broad
application should likewise deserve the highest protection under the First Amendment.
This category should necessarily include those petitions at the heart of self-
government: the process of generating rules governing conduct in our complex society.
Likewise, although the right to petition the judiciary may not be dependent on the
related right of assembly, these rights are synergistic, and it is fair to say that as a
matter of grammar and drafting history, group petitioning activities lie at the heart of
the Petition Clause in the same manner that political speech lies at the heart of the
Speech Clause.
C.  The Petition Clause and the Scope of Article III Justiciability
Does the Petition Clause of the First Amendment affect the scope of justiciability
under Article III of the Constitution?  The simple answer might seem to be “no.”
Under this view, the Petition Clause, as applied to the judicial branch, simply
guarantees a right to invoke judicial process that is otherwise within the court’s
jurisdiction.  Under this view, the Petition Clause does not by its terms alter or amend
the jurisdictional terms of Article III of the Constitution.  Indeed, by its terms, the
Petition Clause does not speak to Constitutional or judicial doctrines at all, but only
to restrictions imposed by Congress.  
There are reasons this simple answer is wrong.  If Article III justiciability limits
were all clearly defined, then the argument that the Petition Clause does no more than
provide for such access to courts as is spelled out in Article III might make sense.
Certainly, the Petition Clause would not be an argument for federal court jurisdiction
over a common law claim asserted by the resident of one state against another resident
of the same state, as such a claim would not fall within either “arising under” or
diversity jurisdiction under Article III.  But when it comes to the justiciability limits
of Article III, such as standing doctrine, the limits are not sufficiently well defined to
make the tautological answer—that the Petition Clause simply affords whatever court
access that is already granted in Article III—a satisfactory one.  The Court
acknowledged that “the strict, formalistic view of Art. III jurisprudence, while perhaps
the starting point of all inquiry, is riddled with exceptions” that serve competing
“practicalities and prudential considerations.”430  As long as the justiciability doctrine
balances competing interests, it ought to consider the constitutional interest to petition
all branches for redress of grievances, which is enshrined in the First Amendment and
reflects centuries of history.
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This is not to say that the right to petition trumps justiciability concerns in all
cases.  The Supreme Court has rejected the idea of an “absolute” right to petition just
as it has rejected the notion of absolute First Amendment freedom of speech rights.
In McDonald v. Smith,431 the Court held that the right to petition did not shield a
defamation suit brought by a rejected nominee for attorney general against a citizen
who wrote a letter to President Nixon claiming that the nominee was unsuitable for the
post.432  Rather, the Court held that the defamation action was subject to the same
“actual malice” standard it had adopted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan433 for First
Amendment speech analysis of public figure defamation actions generally.434
New York Times provides an answer, also, to the question of whether the Petition
Clause should extend beyond its literal application to limit Congressional action.  In
New York Times, the Court extended First Amendment freedom of speech protections
to limit the scope of recovery in a state common law defamation action despite the lack
of Congressional or state legislative action.435  New York Times rejected the argument
that judicially created common law rules of libel recovery failed to invoke sufficient
state action to justify application of the First Amendment press freedoms through
incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.436  The Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause likewise incorporates the Petition Clause as a
restriction on all government actions restricting access to courts, not just Congressional
action.437
New York Times, like other Supreme Court cases, recognized that the highest First
Amendment values apply to First Amendment protected activities that affect the
process of self-governance.  These values are accorded the highest weight when
balanced against government interests supporting regulation of First Amendment
protected activities.  Though New York Times and its progeny considered political
speech directed towards electoral and legislative politics, likewise its reasoning should
apply to judicial petitioning activities that directly affect the law making process—the
final judicial step in review of administrative rulemaking activity.  In United States v.
Cruikshank,438 the Court stated that “[t]he very idea of a government, republican in
form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.”439
Standing doctrine, throughout its existence, has consisted of a balancing of
competing interests, and the Petition Clause created an interest in access to courts by
all sides of an issue to be heard in the judicial consideration of administrative
rulemaking.  Heretofore, this Petition Clause interest has not been considered in
standing analysis.  In the next section of this Article, the application of First
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Amendment functional self-governance analysis to standing doctrine shall be
considered, particularly in the case of standing to review government rulemaking.
VII.  A FUNCTIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF 
STANDING BY IDEOLOGICAL PLAINTIFFS
In McDonald v. Smith,  the Supreme Court declared that the Petition Clause is “cut
from the same cloth” as the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment, and
applied the same balancing of First Amendment interests that it adopted for the press,
in New York Times, to petitioning activity.440  The New York Times decision accorded
the press protection specifically to protect the functional role of First Amendment
freedoms in promoting republican self-government and protecting political speech
actually related to public officials in a defamation claim.  First Amendment speech
theory has long articulated both the functional benefits of free speech in the search for
political truth in a system of self-government, as well as the more individual speech
benefits of self-expression and autonomy.  Although courts have yet to recognize it,
judicial petitioning activity also lends itself to analysis both as an aspect of individual
autonomy and a functional part of self-government.  With recognition of the dispositive
role the judiciary plays in the “marketplace” of certain ideas, a functional analysis of
judicial petitioning activity should lead to more judicial receptivity for standing for
ideological plaintiffs seeking to assert these ideas.  Although courthouses may not be
a “public forum” for speech purposes, courts are the exclusive public forum for
petitioning the judicial branch for redress.  At a minimum, current standing doctrine
should be subject to scrutiny for the substantiality of the government interests served
by standing doctrine and the efficacy of standing doctrine in meeting those interests.
A.  Foundational Interests in First Amendment Analysis
The twentieth century saw extensive development, both academically and
judicially, of a foundational theory of interests protected by the Speech and Press
Clauses of the First Amendment.441  Academic theory has progressed over this time
period from positing the First Amendment’s fundamental role as creating a free and
open marketplace of ideas in a search for truth in aid of self-government, to recognition
of the direct role of speech and the press in self government, to free speech as an
essential aspect of autonomy and self-expression independent of its relation to self-
government, and to retrenchment as the self-expressive theory of speech seemed
limitless.  Academic pursuit of a “Grand Theory” of the First Amendment seems to be
gaining on theoretical physicists’ pursuit of a unified theory of matter in terms of
academic energy expended.  However, judicial doctrine has not quite kept up with the
academic theorists, and continues to recognize the “marketplace of ideas,” self-
government, and self-realization interests protected by the First Amendment Speech
and Press Clauses.
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1.  The “Marketplace of Ideas”
Professor Zechariah Chafee is credited with positing the foundational functional
role of Free Speech as one of ensuring an open “marketplace of ideas” in which free
expression of competing and conflicting viewpoints will ultimately lead to the societal
discovery and acceptance of truth, essential to intelligent self-government in a
republic.442  Professor Chafee posited that the value of the First Amendment’s
protection of speech lay not in its protection of an individual “right,” which leads only
to deadlock in conflicts with communitarian and government “rights” to protect civil
government from insurrection and to wage war.443  Professor Chafee’s fundamental
insight was that the First Amendment’s Speech Clause advanced not just individual
interests, but advanced a functional self-governance interest in vigorous debate on
public issues in order to better inform and educate decisionmakers.  Chafee suggested
a balancing of the communitarian interests in both order and stability against the
functional First Amendment “social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the
country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest
way.”444  Additionally, his suggestion of a marketplace of ideas drew on capitalist
economic theory and posited that, just as a free market in goods is assumed to allocate
economic resources with the greatest efficiency, a free market of ideas will yield
“truth.”
Professor Chafee’s marketplace of ideas theory of the Speech Clause first found
judicial acceptance in Justice Holmes’s famous dissent in Abrams v. United States,445
a prosecution for violations of the Espionage Act that the Supreme Court ultimately
affirmed when confronted with a First Amendment challenge.446  Justice Holmes took
Professor Chafee’s marketplace of ideas metaphor and attributed it to the framers of
the First Amendment as their fundamental assumption:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out.  That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.447
While originally adopted in a dissent, this “marketplace of ideas” metaphor has
become part of the judicial vernacular for assessing First Amendment issues.  In
Thornhill v. Alabama,448 the Court explicitly adopted the public’s interest in the free
flow of information as the foundational rationale for the First Amendment’s
communicative freedoms: “Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press . . .
impairs those opportunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise
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of the power of correcting error through the processes of popular government.”449
Subsequently the Court described the “purpose of the First Amendment” as “to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”450
Supreme Court opinions continue to make routine references to the public interest in
the “marketplace of ideas” as a foundational element of First Amendment doctrine.451
Professor Chafee and Justice Holmes promoted the metaphor of a marketplace of
ideas, and it eventually stuck.  Its importance lies not just as a means of assigning
weight to First Amendment interests, but also in its foundational recognition that First
Amendment interests are not those of the speaker alone, but include those of the public,
and our system of self-government, in hearing every side of contested issues.
2.  Speech as Self-Government
The development of the functional values of First Amendment communication
took a step beyond the marketplace of ideas by incorporating the direct role of speech
in the process of self-governance.  Justice Brandeis is credited with first identifying the
direct self-government role played by speech, in a concurring opinion in California v.
Whitney.452  Although Justice Brandeis concurred in the judgment upholding a
conviction for associating with the Communist Party, he wrote that the framers
“believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”453  Justice Holmes added
that the “greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government.”454
Professor Alexander Meiklejohn expanded this principle to posit a theory of the
First Amendment based exclusively on the values of speech to self-government.455
This view eschewed the marketplace of ideas as an end or good in itself.456  Rather, it
posited that freedom of speech was valuable not because it leads to political truth, but
because speech is essential to the process of self-government itself.457  Public political
speech is self-government, and as such, in Professor Meiklejohn’s view, it is absolutely
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protected from government interference.458  Other forms of speech—commercial or
“private speech” in particular—do not merit the absolute protection Professor
Meiklejohn would afford to public political speech; rather, such lesser value speech
interests should be subject to balancing like other liberty interests under a due process
analysis.459
Professor Meiklejohn’s paradigm of speech as self-government itself has also
received Supreme Court endorsement.  Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in New York
Times, which imposed an actual malice standard for defamation actions brought by
public figures,460 owed a debt to Meiklejohn’s theory in placing political speech and
its role in self-government at the center of First Amendment analysis.461  A few years
later, in Garrison v. Louisiana,462 the Court more explicitly adopted Professor
Meiklejohn’s approach, holding that “speech concerning public affairs is more than
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”463 
Professor Meiklejohn’s position that First Amendment speech, as limited to speech
of political value, was absolutely protected from government sanction or interference
never garnered a majority of the Supreme Court, and was ultimately rejected.464
Nevertheless, his placement of public political speech, and its role in self-government,
at the center of First Amendment free speech continues to influence First Amendment
doctrine.  The Supreme Court continues to hold that political speech, and speech on
political issues, “has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values.”465 
3.  Speech as Self-Realization
Central to Professor Meiklejohn’s theory of First Amendment values is the
distinction between public, political speech, to be absolutely protected,466 and private
speech, which is to be protected, if at all, under a due process balancing analysis.467
This distinction itself contained the seeds of its own demise, as it became impossible
to deny any self-governance values to whole categories of speech Professor Meiklejohn
would have excluded from protection—such as commercial advertising, literature, and
art.  While he initially excluded it from his category of absolutely protected speech,
Professor Meiklejohn himself would ultimately recognize the potential political value
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of art and literature, and would expand his definition of public speech to include the
arts.468  Meanwhile, the Supreme Court had not joined Meiklejohn in abandoning the
marketplace of ideas metaphor in this context.  The Court would recognize that,
although entitled to perhaps less protection than “pure” political speech, commercial
speech—even paid advertising—added to the marketplace of ideas and deserved some
measure of First Amendment protection.469
As the categories of protected speech grew according to intuitive notions of what
should be included in the scope of First Amendment theory, Professor Meiklejohn’s
focus on political self-governance as the sole unifying First Amendment value broke
down.  Other First Amendment theorists, most notably Thomas Emerson and Martin
H. Redish, posited a broader system of values protected by the First Amendment.470
Central among these non-political values was the libertarian value of self-realization:
expression was an essential aspect of autonomy and this self-development that should
not be restricted by the state.  Professor Emerson posited that this self-realization value
was part of a multicentric system of First Amendment values;471 Professor Redish
posited that this self-realization value was the core value of the First Amendment.472
The Supreme Court accepted, at least implicitly, the self-realization value inherent
in the First Amendment in its decision in Stanley v. Georgia,473 which struck down a
conviction for solely private possession and viewing of obscene materials.  In Stanley,
Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court summed up the First Amendment interest in
terms of individual autonomy without reference to self-governance: “Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men's minds.”474
4.  Current Judicial Doctrine
The Court continues to adhere to Professor Meiklejohn’s notion that speech
related to politics and self-government merits the highest degree of protection.  Indeed,
in a recent term, the Court struck down application of the McCain-Feingold campaign
finance law to issue-related advertising naming specific candidates immediately before
an election.475
Current free speech doctrine places the foundation of First Amendment speech
guarantees in the systemic values of speech to a self-governing citizenry.  In Thornhill
v. Alabama,476 the Court continued to rely on this rationale:
The safeguarding of these rights to the ends that men may speak as they think on
matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed through the processes of
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education and discussion is essential to free government.  Those who won our
independence had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and
communication of ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth.  Noxious
doctrines in those fields may be refuted and their evil averted by the courageous
exercise of the right of free discussion.  Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the
press, however, impairs those opportunities for public education that are essential to
effective exercise of the power of correcting error through the processes of popular
government.477
Thus, First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is justified not based on the
individual’s right to speak, but the loss to a deliberative citizenry of the opportunity to
hear what its members would have said: “Many persons, rather than undertake the
considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-
case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected speech—harming not only
themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas.”478  
This recognition of the systemic value of protected speech also underlies the
Court’s stratification of speech categories for protection, with political speech
receiving the highest protection, and merely self-expressive and commercial speech
receiving the lowest protection.  According to the Court, “not all speech is of equal
First Amendment importance,” rather “[i]t is speech on ‘matters of public concern’ that
is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’”479   Thus, the Court “reaffirmed
that speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special protection.”480
The weight of Supreme Court doctrine as well as the weight of academic
commentary thus continues to place the foundational core of the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment in the societal and systemic values of how speech advances
self-government and analyzes restrictions on speech in terms of how those restrictions
impede the free flow of information essential to self-government.
B.  First Amendment Doctrine and Judicial Standing
Contrast the Court’s approach to the Free Speech Clause—which emphasizes the
systemic values of speech to a system of self-government over individual autonomy
values—with the Court’s approach to standing doctrine, which emphasizes individual
values of injury-in-fact over consideration of the systemic value of access to court for
judicial review.  Yet the Court has acknowledged that the Petition Clause guarantee of
the First Amendment includes petitions to the judicial branch for redress and has
suggested that the Petition and Speech Clauses are “cut from the same cloth.”481  If
anything, the Petition Clause is textually more firmly anchored to the system of
representative self-government—and the relationship between citizen and state—than
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the Free Speech Clause.  After all, the Petition Clause directly guarantees the right to
“petition Government for the redress of grievances.”482  Should the restrictions on
Petition Clause interests—“cut from the same cloth” as the Free Speech and Press
Clauses—not be subject to a functional analysis that is at least analogous to the
rigorous scrutiny afforded to restrictions on speech interests?  Does the ideological
plaintiff have a constitutional interest in access to the judicial marketplace of ideas?
Like political speech, judicial review of administrative action serves important
systemic interests that go well beyond the vindication of the rights of individual
litigants before the courts.  Such review helps ensure that the decisions of the most
democratically responsive branch of government are in fact carried out and serves as
an ultimate check on arbitrary executive action nullifying congressional action.  As the
Free Speech Clause implicitly ensures the free flow of information to the electorate,
the Petition Clause explicitly ensures the free flow of communication from the citizenry
to the organs of government, including the judicial organ.
Based on the functional values of speech, First Amendment doctrine invokes
heightened judicial scrutiny of limitations on access to public forums and of limitations
that have content-discriminatory or viewpoint-discriminatory effects, even if such
limitations are facially neutral.  The Court has applied this Free Speech Clause scrutiny
to judicially crafted doctrines and remedies, and it has applied this scrutiny even to
restrictions designed to accommodate competing constitutional values, such as the
Establishment Clause.  The Court has also noted that Petition Clause interests should
be subject to analysis similar to Free Speech Clause interests: “Although the right to
petition and the right to free speech are separate guarantees, they are related and
generally subject to the same constitutional analysis.”483
A functional analysis of standing doctrine would recognize that the judicial system
is not only a First Amendment public forum for the purpose of judicial petitioning
rights, but also that it is the only judicial public forum for petitioning rights.  The
disparate access to such a forum should be subject to heightened scrutiny and should
be upheld only where the distinctions are substantially related to an important
governmental interest.  Similarly, as current standing doctrine has the effect of favoring
one viewpoint (i.e., challenges to overregulation brought by regulated industry) over
another viewpoint (i.e., challenges to underregulation brought by regulatory
beneficiaries), this viewpoint-discriminatory effect should invoke heightened scrutiny
under a First Amendment analysis.  Under such analysis, the rationales for a restrictive
standing doctrine offered by the Supreme Court fail, as they fall short of the sort of
governmental interests that justify restrictions on First Amendment interests or can be
achieved with a less restrictive version of standing doctrine.
1.  The Judicial Forum as a Petition Clause Public Forum
The Supreme Court has suggested that the courthouse itself is not a public forum
for freedom of speech purposes.484  This holding cannot be determinative of the
question whether the courts should be considered a public forum for the purpose of
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Petition Clause rights.  There is a world of difference between a claimed right to carry
placards across the literal threshold of the courthouse and assertion of the Petition
Clause interest in access to the only forum available for prosecution of judicial
petitions.  Though the Free Speech and Petition Clauses may be “cut from the same
cloth” in their relation to self government, that does not mean that they are identical.
Otherwise the Petition Clause would be mere surplusage.
The Supreme Court has recognized that for Free Speech Clause purposes, some
locales, such as streets and parks, have been associated with freedom of expression
since the founding and as such are invariably given public forum status for First
Amendment purposes.  As Justice Roberts wrote, “Wherever the title of streets and
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”485  For judicial petitioning
purposes, the court system has analogous status as an irreducible public forum, indeed
the only forum available.
The Court has also recognized that some institutions are uniquely suited to debate
of diverse viewpoints and must accordingly be treated as public forums: “The college
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly ‘the marketplace of ideas.’”486 
Whatever validity the marketplace of ideas metaphor holds for the functional role of
political speech to influence government policy, this metaphor is undoubtedly valid as
a description of the role of the judicial function in our adversary system.  The
marketplace of ideas metaphor itself supports recognition of the judicial forum as an
irreducible public forum for petitioning activity.  Furthermore, even if the judicial
forum were not considered to be an obligatory public forum for petitioning purposes,
once this forum has been opened up to one viewpoint—that of regulated entities—
access by another viewpoint—regulatory beneficiaries—should not be restricted.  The
Supreme Court has held that once a government institution voluntarily opens a public
forum for use by some groups, it cannot exclude other groups based on the content of
their speech.487
In this explicit marketplace of ideas, the functional value of standing for
ideologically-motivated regulatory beneficiaries is evident.  If judicial decisionmaking
benefits from sharp presentation of the issues and vigorous advocacy, the judicial
process and our system of checks and balances suffer from preferential access to the
judicial forum for one side (the regulated side) of the debate.  Just as the functioning
of the political branches of government benefit from more speech and the airing of
diverse viewpoints, so too is the proper judicial function in an adversary system
absolutely dependent on equal access by both sides of the regulatory debate.  The
judiciary’s hostility to ideological plaintiffs stands in marked contrast to its receptivity
to the “marketplace” of ideas in other First Amendment contexts.
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Rules limiting access to First Amendment public forums are subject to heightened
scrutiny.488  The Supreme Court has applied a general four-part test to government
regulation of public fora: 
[G]overnment regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment Freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.489
In an alternative formulation, such restrictions must be “content-neutral, . . . narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
means of communication.”490
The lack of any equivalent alternative to the judicial forum for First Amendment
petitioning activity argues for careful scrutiny of standing rules that restrict access to
court.  Such scrutiny would require an examination of the governmental interests
served by a restrictive standing doctrine and the tightness of the fit between standing
rules and these government means.
2.  Standing Doctrine as an Incidental Restriction of First Amendment Activity
Although standing doctrine is thus a limit on access to the exclusive federal
judicial petitioning forum, even if the courts were not a public forum for this purpose,
standing doctrine would merit heightened scrutiny as limitation of First Amendment
protected petitioning activity.
In United States v. O’Brien,491 the Supreme Court established the test for the
analysis of government regulation that incidentally burdens First Amendment protected
activities.492  In O’Brien, the Court rejected a challenge to a Selective Service law
amendment that criminalized the destruction of draft registration cards.493  O’Brien was
prosecuted under the statute for publicly burning his draft card in protest of the
Vietnam War.  In upholding O’Brien’s conviction, the Court established the same four-
part test for government regulation of conduct that incidentally burdens speech that has
subsequently been used to analyze time, place, and manner restrictions governing
access to public fora.494  In applying this test, the Court refused to look to the
subjective motivation of the legislature in enacting the prohibition to determine
whether the legislature in fact sought to suppress free expression; rather, it was the
stated purpose alone of the legislature (i.e., to administer the draft registration
program) that was accepted as one unrelated to the suppression of speech.
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In O’Brien, the Court addressed a statute that regulated conduct, albeit conduct
with a politically expressive element.  The Court found that the governmental interest
in regulating the “conduct” aspect of O’Brien’s activities justified the incidental
restriction on the First Amendment protected expressive elements.  Though standing
analysis might be analyzed in a similar framework, searching for non-suppressive
justifications for restrictions on Court access, standing restrictions on judicial
petitioning activity are distinct from the symbolic speech activity considered in
O’Brien.  The judicial access interests compromised by standing barriers are “pure”
First Amendment interests that are not intermingled with “unprotected” conduct.
The O’Brien test has been characterized as “intermediate” First Amendment
scrutiny.   Although such scrutiny purports to be more searching than the “rational
basis” scrutiny applied to governmental action generally under the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses, some commentators have noted that “intermediate scrutiny”
is nearly as deferential as rational basis review, and almost unfailingly results in
rejection of the First Amendment challenge.495
3.  Heightened Scrutiny for Viewpoint Discriminatory Impacts
As I have described in some detail earlier in this Article, the presumption of
standing for regulatory “objects” and the associated “heavy burden” to establish
standing for those challenging under-regulation is viewpoint discriminatory in its
effect.
Under current First Amendment doctrine, forum access restrictions that draw
explicit viewpoint-based distinctions are almost universally invalid.496  However, the
Supreme Court has been less consistent in the level of scrutiny applied to access
restrictions, like standing rules, that have viewpoint discriminatory effects despite
being facially neutral.  In some cases, the Supreme Court has struck down regulations,
such as ballot access deadlines, that disproportionately impacted minor party
candidates, while in other cases the Supreme Court has upheld practices, such as the
passive enforcement of draft registration rules, which disproportionately affect political
dissidents.  Review of these cases suggests that standing doctrine, as a rule limiting
court access, should be subject to heightened scrutiny since it limits access to the only
available forum for judicial petitioning activity, and do so in a way that is highly
discretionary and starkly discriminatory in effect.
At times, the Supreme Court has been quite solicitous of dissenting voices
effectively silenced by regulations that, though neutral on their face, have the effect of
eliminating access to the processes of government by a particular social segment or
viewpoint.  Thus, in Anderson v. Celebrezze,497 the Court struck down a statutory
deadline for candidate petitions to be included on a state ballot for presidential
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elections.498  According to the Court, the filing deadline invoked close judicial scrutiny
under the First Amendment because of its disparate impact on minor party candidates:
It is clear, then, that the March filing deadline places a particular burden on an
identifiable segment of Ohio’s independent-minded voters. . . .  As our cases have
held, it is especially difficult for the State to justify a restriction that limits political
participation by an identifiable political group whose members share a particular
viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status.  “Our ballot access cases .
. . focus on the degree to which the challenged restrictions operate as a mechanism to
exclude certain classes of candidates from the electoral process.  The inquiry is
whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the ‘availability
of political opportunity.’”499
In striking down the ballot petition deadline, the Court specifically relied on the
systemic value of minor party candidate participation in the electoral marketplace of
ideas,500 and rejected the “equality of treatment” of major and minor party candidates
as an adequate justification for the disparate impact on minor party candidates.501
Similarly, the Court struck down bans on door to door leafletting on the grounds
that such means of communication was “essential to the poorly financed causes of little
people.”502  The Court also struck down street demonstration permit fees that gave too
much discretion to the municipal official and might be used to favor one viewpoint
over another.503
Lower courts have also expressed heightened solicitude for dissenting viewpoints
when considering regulations with viewpoint differential effects.504  Viewpoint
discriminatory regulations, whether by purpose or effect, are suspect under the First
Amendment because such regulations distort the free market of ideas about politics and
government that has been accepted as foundational in First Amendment political
freedoms.505  The Supreme Court explicitly relied on this distorting effect when it
struck down an order requiring a public utility to include a consumer group’s
newsletter in its billing envelopes: such an order “does not equally constrain both sides
of the debate about utility regulation.”506  The Supreme Court also relied on this
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process-distorting effect, in the specific context of advocacy before the courts, to strike
down restrictions on the scope of arguments permitted to publicly-funded legal services
attorneys.507  As in the utility case, standing doctrine “does not equally constrain both
sides of the debate about . . . regulation.”
The approach in these cases contrasts with Court’s approach in Perry Education
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,508 where the Supreme Court upheld a local
school district regulation that allowed the recognized teachers’ union to distribute
materials in teachers’ mailboxes, but did not allow the competing (unrecognized) union
the same access.509  The dissident union characterized the restriction as one with a
viewpoint-discriminatory effect.510  The Supreme Court rejected this characterization,
preferring to characterize the distinction as being one based on “status.”511  Its
reasoning has some bearing on a First Amendment analysis of standing restrictions:
In the Court of Appeals’ view, however, the access policy adopted by the Perry
schools favors a particular viewpoint, that of PEA, on labor relations, and
consequently must be strictly scrutinized regardless of whether a public forum is
involved.  There is, however, no indication that the School Board intended to
discourage one viewpoint and advance another.  We believe it is more accurate to
characterize the access policy as based on the status of the respective unions rather
than their views.  Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make
distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity.  These
distinctions may be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and inescapable
in the process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended
purpose of the property.  The touchstone for evaluating these distinctions is whether
they are reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves.512
Like the mailbox access restriction in Perry, standing requirements might be
characterized as turning on the “status” of the judicial petitioner.  Indeed, “status” is
a synonym for the word “standing.”513  Should standing restrictions be analyzed, as
against a First Amendment Petition Clause challenge, solely on the basis of their
“reasonableness,” the least inquisitive mode of constitutional scrutiny?
The level of scrutiny afforded to standing restrictions under Perry turns on the
question whether the judicial forum is considered analogous to a Speech Clause
“public forum” for judicial petitioning activity.  According to the Perry Court, “subject
matter” and “speaker identity” distinctions that would be impermissible in a public
forum are subject to only a reasonableness inquiry in the case of a non-public forum,
where activities may properly be limited to the “intended purpose” of the forum.514
Does this describe the judicial forum, in which participation may be limited to those
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parties with the “status” of traditional Article III litigants asserting a personalized
interest to remedy a discrete injury?
Applying the Perry paradigm to the judicial forum returns us to the circularity that
plagues standing doctrine in the first place.  To argue Perry is to argue that the
courthouse is a limited non-public forum, open only to those who have “status” in the
form of “judicial standing” to assert their claims; this status, in turn depends on
whether the courthouse has traditionally been open to such claimants in the first place.
Such an argument reads the Petition Clause out of the First Amendment.  Though the
Petition and Speech Clauses may be cut from the same cloth, they are not identical, and
the Petition Clause must add something to First Amendment analysis of judicial access
claims.
A better approach would be to read the Petition Clause to create a “public forum”
equivalent, for judicial petitioning purposes.  As the irreducible public forum for
judicial petitioning activities, restrictions on judicial access based on “status” and
restrictions with viewpoint discriminatory effects should be subject to strict First
Amendment scrutiny to determine whether they achieve a compelling governmental
interest through narrowly tailored means.  Such an approach is far more consonant with
the systemic values of having all sides of public issues aired in petitioning activity
directed towards each of the branches of government: “There is an ‘equality of status
in the field of ideas,’ and government must afford all points of view an equal
opportunity to be heard.”515
4.  First Amendment Scrutiny of Judicially-Crafted and 
Constitutionally-Based Distinctions
There are two ways in which the restrictions of standing doctrine differ from the
sorts of government actions most commonly analyzed under the First Amendment.
Unlike the statutory and administrative actions typically subject to First Amendment
scrutiny for their limiting effects on First Amendment activities, standing doctrine is
judicially created and administered.  Standing doctrine also roots itself in the case or
controversy provisions of Article III of the Constitution.  There is precedent for First
Amendment scrutiny of both judicially crafted restrictions of First Amendment
activities and for distinctions based on other constitutional values.  Neither of these
factors should shield standing doctrine from a First Amendment analysis.
The Supreme Court has reviewed judicially-crafted injunctions for consistency
with First Amendment protections as a matter of course.  Thus, in Madsen v. Women’s
Health Center, Inc.,516 the Court subjected a judicial injunction barring abortion
protesters from interfering with patients at a reproductive health clinic to First
Amendment analysis, upholding the injunction in part, and striking it down in part.517
The majority applied a “somewhat more stringent application of general First
Amendment principles” than would be applied to a statute, reasoning that the risk of
censorship was greater in the case of a judicial order that was not subject to the
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legislative process.518  The Court declined to treat the injunction as a viewpoint-
discriminatory provision simply because a specified class of people who shared a point
of view were subject to it, reasoning that such discrimination was inherent in the nature
of an order issued in the context of a specific controversy.519  Nevertheless, the Court
examined the injunction to determine whether the challenged provisions burdened “no
more speech than necessary” to achieve its “pin-pointed objectives.”520
Unlike the case-specific injunctions involved in the abortion protest cases,
judicially-created standing doctrine applies across many kinds of cases and thus, may
be more susceptible to analysis as a viewpoint-discriminatory regulation of court
access.  In any event, Madsen suggests that the scrutiny accorded to such judicially-
created doctrines should be stricter scrutiny than that applied to statutes and regulations
that have undergone the give-and-take of the legislative process.  Thus, although the
Court has elsewhere rejected the “least restrictive means” analysis for content-neutral
time, place, and manner restrictions,521 the Madsen Court’s “no more speech than
necessary” test for judicially-crafted doctrines affecting substantive speech suggests
continued vitality for the “least restrictive means” analysis in this context.
Furthermore, the constitutional nature of the interests advanced for standing
doctrine does not immunize it from First Amendment review.  The Supreme Court has
more than once struck down differential access rules that excluded religious
organizations from use of “voluntary public forums,” despite the justification that such
rules were necessary to avoid governmental endorsement of religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause.  In Widmar v. Vincent,522 the Court acknowledged that
compliance with First Amendment Establishment Clause doctrine would constitute a
sufficiently “compelling” governmental interest to justify narrowly drawn content-
based limits on access to a public forum.523  Avoiding a direct conflict between con-
stitutional values, the Court determined that equal access to the state university campus
facilities for religious student organizations would not violate the Establishment
Clause, and, a fortiori, could not be used to justify the content discrimination.524
However, the Court went on to suggest that even if the distinction were based on a
more restrictive state constitution provision analogous to the Establishment Clause, any
such state constitutional interest would not overcome the First Amendment equal
access values at stake.525  The Court reaffirmed its holding in Widmar v. Vincent in
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District526 in the context of
differential public access to public school facilities, and in Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of University of Virginia527 in the context of state university financial
assistance to student publications.
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Arguably, the First Amendment guarantees of a right to petition all branches of
government would trump justiciability concerns implicit in the body of the
Constitution, the document that the First Amendment modified.  The Court found that
First Amendment speech interests overcame competing property interests of
constitutional dimension when it held that the streets of a company-owned town
constituted a public forum open to solicitation by Jehovah’s Witnesses.528  But even if
the Petition Clause is not read as a modification of Article III justiciability notions, it
is at the very least a source of competing constitutional values that must be considered
by the courts as they engage in the balancing of interests underlying standing doctrine.
The Court has recognized the internal conflict between the First Amendment
Expression and Free Exercise Clauses and the need to balance the underlying
constitutional values to resolve the conflict.529
The Court’s freedom of expression cases—particularly its cases concerning access
to public forums—suggest a roadmap to the process of balancing these competing
interests.  These cases suggest that a high value should be placed on petitioning activity
that adds to the diversity of viewpoints represented in the judicial forum to the extent
that that forum has become an element of the process of self-governance.  The Court’s
speech cases also suggest heightened scrutiny of restrictions that tend to eliminate an
identifiable viewpoint from the public debate and that eliminate access to a forum for
which no equivalent substitute is available.  Such scrutiny demands that the
governmental doctrine in question serve a compelling governmental interest and that
the means be narrowly drawn toward achieving that interest.  In cases involving the
review of administrative rulemaking, standing doctrine imposes a differential burden
on a specific viewpoint—that of regulatory beneficiaries seeking to ensure stricter
regulation—and eliminates for many of them the exclusive public forum for the airing
of their views and grievances.  Let us assume, as the Court has, that the constitutional
values served by standing doctrine are compelling.  Standing doctrine should thus be
re-examined to determine whether it indeed serves its constitutional values through
means narrowly drawn.
C.  Assessing the Means and Ends of Standing Doctrine
Earlier in this Article, I reviewed the constitutional values and functional interests
that have been identified in support of standing restrictions.  These interests and
justifications include the theoretical separation-of-power interests in restricting the
function of the judicial branch to the “judicial” function and in preventing judicial
usurpation of the executive and legislative roles.  They also include the more functional
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interests in ensuring the quality of the litigation process, avoiding sham and collusive
litigation, and managing the federal court docket.
As I discussed earlier, some of the justifications for standing doctrine are
ultimately self-referential and circular.  Justifications based on the inherent nature of
a case or controversy, those based on the traditional role of the courts, and those based
on a sense of the historical nature of the judicial function have been shown to be
unsupported by text and history.  Ultimately these self-referential justifications for
standing boil down to judicial declarations that a case or controversy is what the
justices of the Supreme Court say it is, nothing more and nothing less.  Any attempt to
analyze such justifications for a compelling governmental interest with means narrowly
drawn is reduced to a simple declaration that confining the judiciary to the judicial role
(as the courts have defined it) is a compelling interest, and by definition the means are
narrowly drawn and excluded no more speech than necessary to serve that interest.
Such a tautological approach would not be justified in the case of competing
constitutional values.  As the Court itself has acknowledged, the contours of standing
doctrine are not absolute, but consist of a balancing of the competing interests
involved.530  When constitutional values compete, the Court’s usual approach is not to
afford absolute status to one constitutional value and ignore the other.531  Balancing
competing constitutional values requires an identification of the foundational
underpinnings of the competing values and an interpretation of the provisions in
question to accommodate both sets of values.  These foundational interests, for the
First Amendment political freedoms (such as freedom of petition), include interests in
vigorous debate, open to all points of view, and interests in avoiding rules that distort
the debate by favoring one view over the other.  On the other hand, the non-definitional
constitutional interests served by standing doctrine include the interest in avoiding
excessive judicial intrusion into the duty of the executive to “take care” that the laws
are faithfully executed, the interest in avoiding advisory opinions given on hypothetical
states of fact, the interest in avoiding judicial intrusion into the congressional
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legislative function, the interest in vigorous presentation of issues for judicial
resolution, and the interest in avoiding collusive or sham litigation.
Let us assume that the various interests served by judicial standing doctrine are
“compelling” governmental interests for First Amendment analysis.  Let us now
examine these interests, the efficiency with which standing doctrine achieves these
interests, and the extent to which these interests might be as well protected with
judicial doctrines less restrictive of the marketplace of ideas and diversity of
viewpoints when ideologically-motivated plaintiffs challenge the sufficiency of
administrative rulemaking to achieve statutory goals.  Such an analysis reveals that
nearly all of these functional goals are already protected by other doctrines of judicial
review, and the remaining goals of ensuring concrete adversity and avoiding sham or
collusive litigation can be better served by means that are less restrictive of a diversity
of viewpoints.
1.  Avoiding Judicial Intrusion into the Executive Role of 
Faithfully Executing the Law
The primary functional value identified for restrictive standing rules is the
avoidance of judicial intrusion into the executive role to “take Care that the Laws are
faithfully executed.”532  This value underpins the separation of powers rationale for
standing rules, at least in the case of challenges to administrative rulemaking.533  The
Executive’s authority under the Take Care Clause is not an absolute constitutional
value.  Rather, the functional values of judicial review at the behest of regulatory
objects (in the former case)—to protect their implicit due process liberty interests in
avoiding invalid regulations—defeat a claim of absolute immunity from judicial
inquiry on the part of the executive branch.  Similarly, when organizational plaintiffs
seek judicial review of the Executive’s failure to adequately enforce the law on behalf
of regulatory beneficiaries, they too invoke constitutional values inherent in the
Petition Clause—both associational values of organized law-influencing activity and
political freedom values of promoting vigorous representation of all viewpoints in
matters of public debate.
Can the Executive’s interest in its freedom of action under the Take Care Clause
be accommodated through means less restrictive than a judicial access doctrine that
imposes substantially higher burdens on one side of the regulatory debate than the
other?  Not only can it be accommodated, to a large extent it already has been.  Recall
that the nature of judicial review of administrative rulemaking is highly deferential
under the doctrine of Chevron v. NRDC.  Administrative rulemaking will be upheld
unless it is contrary to the expressed intention of Congress, or is based on a statutory
interpretation that is so out of bounds as to be an “impermissible” reading of the
statute, or is arbitrary and capricious.  This standard of review is based almost self-
consciously on minimizing judicial interference with the executive function of
implementing statutory mandates: 
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When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge
must fail.  In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.  The responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between
competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: “Our Constitution vests
such responsibilities in the political branches.”534
As a result of this highly deferential standard of review, most challenges to agency
regulations fail.535  By definition, the judiciary will interfere with an administrative rule
only if the court determines that the agency has taken an impermissible view of the
underlying legislation.  This can hardly be considered judicial intrusion into the
executive function.  The highly deferential standard of review afforded by Chevron to
agency rulemaking more than adequately protects the Executive’s breathing room for
implementing statutes.  A standing doctrine that distinguishes between those seeking
less regulation and those seeking greater regulation does not add to this executive
freedom of action; rather, if anything, standing doctrine reduces the Executive’s
freedom of action by making one set of choices (more restrictive regulation) more
likely to be litigated and rejected than the other set (less restrictive regulation).
Accordingly, the governmental interest in avoiding judicial intrusion on the
Executive’s function to “take care that the laws are faithfully executed” can be
accommodated by less restrictive means and should not justify a standing doctrine that
distinguishes between regulatory objects and beneficiaries.
2.  Avoiding Advisory Opinions on Hypothetical Facts
The “rule” against advisory opinions is already riddled with exceptions, not the
least of which is the exception for moot cases capable of repetition yet evading review.
To the extent that the rule against advisory opinions is meant to avoid conversion of
the judiciary into an advisory body that opines on the legality of executive action prior
its execution,536 such an interest hardly seems to be invoked at all in cases brought by
public interest organizations to challenge administrative rulemaking that has already
been accomplished.  As with the concerns about interference with the executive
function of taking care that laws are faithfully executed, existing administrative law
doctrines adequately protect the interests of the judiciary in avoiding resolution of
disputes at an unripe, or hypothetical, stage.  Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner537
required specific justification for immediate review of regulations upon promulgation
and precluded litigation of rulemaking challenges that were fact-bound or otherwise
could not be adequately determined until specific application of the rules.  Any
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controversy that survives the Abbott Laboratories inquiry should be far from an
advisory opinion.  The Abbott Laboratories test also ensures sufficient “concreteness”
for presentation of the issues in a judicial setting.  Once again, this existing less
restrictive means serves the judiciary’s interest without imposition of viewpoint
differential standing doctrine.
3.  Avoiding Judicial Intrusion into the Congressional Legislative Function
This justification for restrictive standing rules is simply not applicable in a case
where an ideological plaintiff seeks implementation of a congressional statute as
written as against administrative rulemaking claimed to violate the statute.  Far from
being a “Council of Revision”538 in such a case, the judiciary is simply performing its
traditional judicial function to “say what the law is”539 (within the deferential
parameters of Chevron, of course).  Nor does ideological litigation on behalf of
regulatory beneficiaries involve the least democratically responsible branch at odds
with the most democratically responsible branch; to the contrary, the judiciary is
simply implementing the will of the directly elected branch as opposed to the
interpretation of agencies responsible to an indirectly elected executive.540
4.  Interest in Vigorous Presentation of Issues
This is a more utilitarian rationale for standing doctrine.  Theoretically, the extent
of a plaintiff’s personal stake in a controversy has some direct bearing on the vigor and
care with which the plaintiff is likely to pursue and present her case.  However, given
the low absolute economic value of the standing bar established by the Supreme
Court—“an identifiable trifle will suffice”541—injury-in-fact becomes a very poor
proxy for either inclination or capacity to mount a vigorous challenge to rulemaking.
As noted earlier, Judge Scalia acknowledged that “if the purpose of standing is ‘to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues,’ the
doctrine is remarkably ill designed for its end,” and that “[o]ften the best adversaries
are national organizations such as the NAACP or the American Civil Liberties Union
that have a keen interest in the abstract question at issue in the case, but no ‘concrete
injury-in-fact’ whatsoever.”542  Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find a single
rulemaking challenge brought by an individual regulatory beneficiary, without the
assistance and support of a public interest organization, because their personal stake
in the case was so great that they would invest the hundreds of thousands of dollars
necessary for vigorous litigation to protect their interests.  Current standing doctrine,
which has the perverse effect of disqualifying public interest organizations with the
capacity and inclination to litigate regulatory issues, falls far short of serving the
interest in assuring vigorous presentation of the issues.   A standing test that focused
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more narrowly on the organizational capacity and interest of the ideological plaintiff
organization would be a much more narrowly tailored means of achieving this
governmental interest.
5.  Avoidance of Sham or Collusive Litigation
As with the interest in assuring concrete adversity, there is some theoretical
relationship between a plaintiff’s personal stake in a controversy and the relative
unlikelihood that that plaintiff would act against her own interests by colluding with
a defendant to obtain a ruling.  Once again, the “trifling” nature of the requisite
personal stake reduces the effectiveness of standing doctrine as a means to assure this
rarely invoked judicial interest.  As with the interest in concrete adversity, it is likely
that an inquiry into the organizational capacity and purposes of an organizational
plaintiff would more effectively achieve this goal without the viewpoint discriminatory
effects of the injury-in-fact requirement as applied to rulemaking challenges. 
While the means-ends analysis of heightened First Amendment scrutiny is itself
somewhat subjective, this functional analysis does suggest that most of the identifiable
constitutional Article III and separation of powers interests served by standing doctrine
are adequately served, at least in the case of administrative rulemaking challenges, by
existing doctrines restricting the scope and availability of judicial review of
rulemaking.  This analysis does not necessarily suggest the abandonment of standing
doctrine, but rather its refinement to recognize that the constitutional values implicated
by standing doctrine differ according to the nature of the litigation in question.
Standing to challenge action by administrative agencies that are indirectly responsible
to the electorate and subject to influence by the regulated community should hardly be
addressed on the same terms as standing to challenge congressional legislation on the
grounds that the action of an elected coordinate governmental branch violates the
Constitution.
D.   A More Closely Tailored Standing Doctrine
This analysis demonstrates that of all the functional interests served by standing
restrictions, only two—ensuring vigorous advocacy and avoiding collusive
litigation—are not adequately protected by existing doctrines of deference and
ripeness.  Nor is existing standing doctrine narrowly (or even loosely) tailored to
address these interests in promoting vigor and avoiding collusion.  Although standing
doctrine may be a relatively late innovation in justiciability, its persistence suggests
that it addresses a strong intuitive sense that judicial remedies are inherently limited
to the “right” kind of plaintiff.  I do not advocate an abandonment of this inquiry into
the “rightness” of the plaintiff, just a redefinition of “rightness,” at least in the context
of rulemaking challenges, to more narrowly address the proper judicial concerns for
vigorous advocacy and genuineness while preserving the right to petition interests in
full expositions of both sides of the regulatory debate.
Standing to challenge regulatory action should inquire directly into the
organizational or individual capacity and genuineness of the plaintiff, rather than
464 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2
543. Injury-in-fact may well serve as an appropriate proxy for “genuineness” in actions seeking more
particularized relief, such as enforcement of a regulatory standard in a particular case.  Cf. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
544. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
545. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32 (1940)).
546. See id. at 560.
547. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
548. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979).
549. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999 (1982); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974);
Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 860 (9th Cir. 2001); Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 173-74 n.10
(2d Cir. 2001).  In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), the Supreme Court considered an appeal
challenging durational residency requirements for divorce despite the mootness of the named plaintiff’s case
and the impossibility of repetition with respect to her, on the grounds that unnamed (and unidentified) class
representatives might still be affected by the rule.  This application of the “capable of repetition yet evading
review” exception to mootness supports the thesis of this Article that the lack of an identified individual
with a live injury does not absolutely precludes Article III jurisdiction over a representative case.
artificial and trifling notions of injury-in-fact.543  Courts routinely inquire about the
litigating capacity of plaintiffs as part of the class certification process under Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.544  Additionally, courts may also examine the
genuineness of the plaintiff’s interests to ensure against sham or collusive litigation.545
1.   Organizational Litigating Capacity
A narrowly tailored standing inquiry might draw from concepts of representative
capacity for certifying class action representatives.  Indeed, the class action and the
regulatory challenge brought in virtually representative capacity by ideologically
motivated organizational plaintiffs address the same problem: the problem of collective
action to protect widely shared interests that lack sufficient value to motivate protective
actions by individuals or small groups.  Thus, the class action device has been
described as a device to accommodate the adjudication of large numbers of small
claims that would otherwise not be vindicated.546  Chief Justice Burger described the
class action device in terms of regulatory failure that might equally describe public
interest rulemaking challenges:
The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an
evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action
of government.  Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the
traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages,
aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the
class-action device.547
Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld the use of the class action device as a means of
challenging government regulations on behalf of regulatory beneficiaries.548
The class action device does not solve the Petition Clause issue addressed by this
Article because class action certification, like representative standing doctrine, requires
identification of an individual class member who would have standing.549  However,
the Rule 23 inquiry into the representative capacity of a plaintiff is perfectly tailored
to ensure the presentation of issues underlying standing doctrine.  Federal courts
describe this inquiry in the same terms used to describe the standing interest in
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“vigorous” prosecution of claims: “it must appear that the representative will
vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel.”550  In making
this inquiry, courts look both to the nature of the named plaintiff, and to the nature of
the class attorneys.  The attorney must be “qualified, experienced, and generally able
to conduct the proposed litigation.”551  Courts may also inquire into whether the named
plaintiffs possess adequate financial resources to prosecute the litigation.552
Thus, an inquiry into the adequacy of counsel and resources identical to that
conducted under Rule 23 would achieve the judicial interest in vigorous advocacy and
sharp presentation of issues.  The Supreme Court has previously recognized the
representational value and resources organization plaintiffs bring to public rights
litigation.553  There can be little doubt that the national organizations such as the
NRDC, which seek standing on behalf of regulatory beneficiaries, would more than
satisfy the adequacy of counsel and sufficiency of resources requirements. 
2.  Genuineness of Plaintiff Interest
The class certification inquiry into the suitability of class representatives also
serves to guard against collusive or sham litigation.554  Although federal courts have
asserted the authority to dismiss sham or collusive lawsuits sua sponte,555 few cases can
be found that have sustained dismissals based on collusion.556 
However, in the case of organization plaintiffs asserting pluralistic interests,
judicial inquiry into the organizational bona fides should not be difficult.  The
organizational standing inquiry already includes a determination of whether the
litigation falls within the organizational purposes of the plaintiff organization.557  The
true organizational interests of a litigating not-for-profit organization are easily deter-
mined by reference to its fundraising literature and the nature of its large contributors.
In any event, a judicial inquiry into the advocacy capacity and organizational bona
fides of an ideological plaintiff challenging regulatory inaction should be less difficult
than the evanescent law of injury-in-fact in current standing doctrine, which engages
courts in arcane inquiries into statistical probabilities of an individual NRDC member
contracting cancer, or the bona fides of a Friends of the Earth supporter’s claim to be
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“concerned” about the health effects of minute amounts of mercury contamination in
the North Tyger River.  Such a direct inquiry into capacity and bona fides is judicially
manageable, and much more narrowly tailored to serve the structural Article III
interests underlying standing doctrine than an injury-in-fact inquiry that presumes
standing for one side of the regulatory debate and sets a high burden to establish
standing for the other side.
VIII.  CONCLUSION
Agency rulemaking pursuant to statutory delegation forms a major part of the
modern lawmaking process.  Judicial review is a critical final step in that process.  As
such, equal availability of judicial review is critical to self-governance.  Ideologically
motivated organizational plaintiffs represent pluralistic values in the judicial review
step of this lawmaking process, but the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine establishes
differential barriers to court access, which has the effect of favoring the views of
regulated entities over the views of regulatory beneficiaries.  Consistent with the First
Amendment’s explicit guarantee of court access to petition the judiciary for redress of
grievances, and interests in viewpoint neutrality and maximization of competing
ideological inputs in the process of self-governance, standing doctrine should be
reconsidered in the context of judicial review of rulemaking so as to ensure that the
standing bar is no greater than necessary to serve the identified functional interests
underlying Article III justiciability.  Separation of powers interests are adequately
served by principles of deference, so the standing inquiry should focus on the
legitimate concerns for vigorous advocacy and avoidance of collusive litigation.
